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ABSTRACT
Wars can be categorised in a number of ways, for example according to the conduct during 
conflicts, the means used and with regard to the belligerents’ strategy, aims and objectives. One 
reason for categorising is to add precision to the language so we can better develop proper 
theories and methods, thus aiming at improving our fighting capability. In the wake of these 
theoretical exercises, new terms and sometimes, old terms used in a new way, are introduced.
Since the late 1970s, many lobbyists, military theorists and officers have described warfare in 
terms of a dichotomy; attrition and manoeuvre warfare. Manoeuvre warfare theory is a hybrid of 
selected historical examples and military theories developed under different contextual 
circumstances. The alleged paradigm shift in our approach to war has provided us with, or so we 
believe, a new methodology for conduct in war and the number of terms suited to describe an 
unambiguous theory. True manoeuvre warfare is expressed through operational art. This distinct 
approach to war has now been adopted by military forces throughout the western world.
This thesis looks closer at what manoeuvre warfare aspires to be, in the context of its 
terminology, methodology and its different national expressions. The first part of the thesis is 
concerned with a comparative analysis of different national manoeuvre warfare doctrines by 
using general systems theory and non-linear dynamics. The analysis reveals that, what we call 
manoeuvre warfare theory, has expressions that contradict each other and differ to the extent that 
the theory exists only in name.
The second part of the thesis is concerned with the historical substantiation of manoeuvre 
warfare. German military conduct, but first and foremost the Blitzkrieg-campaigns are often used 
to add credibility to the methods prescribed by manoeuvre theory. Some proponents of the theory 
have chosen General Guderian as the human manifestation of the true manoeuvrist.
By using the Clausewitzian term “Centre of Gravity”, essential in manoeuvre theory as a 
departure point, the second part of the thesis analyses German military conduct and thought prior 
to the Second World War and the campaign in France 1940. Emphasis in the second part is put 
on German planning prior to the campaign and the conduct of the Wehrmachf s Army Group A 
during the execution. The analysis reveals that the German military interpreted Clausewitz in a 
way that is not compatible with strategic thought in modem democratic societies. The German 
pursuit of military effectiveness led to a tacticisation of strategy. Battles of attrition were fought 
with the highest degree of mobility. German military thought in the 1930’s, manifested in the 
field manual Tmppenfühnmg, reveals a pragmatic approach to war, which indicates that there 
was no Blitzkrieg concept as such. Army Group A ’s conduct during the campaign in France also 
contradicts many of the principles and the methodology prescribed by the manoeuvrists. It 
appears that the ambiguous terms and selective historical examples have been interpreted and 
distilled to a degree where they eventually conform to the manoeuvrist thought.
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1 introduction
'T here is le ss  here than m e e ts  
the c v c “
’’Mike, Wes, I see three tanks rolling out of the highway just outside Pristina. Get out there and 
kill them.” ^
When SACEUR, General Wesley Clark, was sitting in his offiee in Mons, Belgium, observing 
live pictures of the three tanks on his monitor, he might have been frustrated. After all, he had 
predicted a 40% probability that Milosevic would give in within three days after the first bombs 
had fallen.  ^Sixty days had passed when he picked up the phone to call his subordinate 
responsible for the air campaign. General Michael Short. The Serbian leader was still playing.
This happened at a time when manoeuvre warfare had been around for some 20 years. By 1999 
most NATO countries had, at least in name, embraced, adopted and made doctrines out of this 
presumably distinct approach to war. One NATO publication states: “NATO’s military 
command stmcture is a particular strength. Since its inception, NATO has integrated diverse 
militaiy forces to achieve common objectives using common doctrine.”  ^Clarke and Short did 
not seem to have common objectives. One was concentrating on tactical level Serbian army units 
in Kosovo. The other preferred so called strategic bombing, targeting power plants so there 
would be “no power to the refrigerator” for the common Serb. ^
1.1 Belli BIpolus
Since the late 1970s, lobbyists, militaiy theorists and offieers have described warfare in terms of 
the dichotomy: attrition and manoeuvre warfare. The pre-eminence of manoeuvre warfare over 
attrition seems to be obvious. Manoeuvre warfare promises rapid decisive victories with 
minimum casualties. This contrasts with what they claim to be the traditional western style of 
war based on attrition. The proponents of manoeuvre warfare argue that the approach to war 
must be expressed through a comprehensive operational doctrine. Moreover, the conduct of war 
must be based on a thorough understanding of operational art. The historical substantiation of 
manoeuvre warfare, its theory and doctrines, is distilled from successful campaigns of the
 ^Tallulah Bankliead, American actress
 ^ Short, Michael, An Airman’s Lesson from Kosovo, in Olsen, Jolm Andreas, ed., From Manoeuvre Warfare to 
Kosovo, (Trondheim, 2001), 285. Short does not date the event.
Cordesman, Anthony H., The Lessons and Non-Lessons o f  the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo, (London, 
2001), 25
 ^NATO, AJP-3.4.1, Peace Support Operations, Ratification Draft, (2001), 1-3. [AJP-3.4.1]
 ^Tii-pak, John, A., Short’s view o f the Air Campaign, Air Force Magazine, (September 1999), 43
German Army in the world wars. According to one manoeuvre warfare proponent, ”[t]he 
Geimans developed the maneuver doctrine before and during World War II.”  ^However, the 
manoeuvre-attrition dichotomy has been extensively debated, at least in the U.S., since its 
introduction into military vocabulary in the 1970’s.
The German military historian Hans Delbriick presented another dichotomy. There were two 
approaches to war: “Vernichtungs-“ and “Ermattungsstrategie^’. A  strategy of annihilation 
{Vermchtimg) sought to destroy the enemy’s military forces in a single decisive battle.® This was 
a strategy of a force seeking the complete defeat of an opponent.^ A strategy of exhaustion 
{Evmattimg) was practised more often by weaker nations, whose aims were limited, and who 
were unable to achieve victory through a decisive tactical battle. These nations followed a ’’two 
pole” strategy of battle and manoeuvre, aiming to win their political goal by exhausting their 
enemy to the point where the conflict could be terminated on favourable or equal terms. His 
proposal for the two strategies was also debated. It was not easy for German officers to admit 
that Fredrick the Great had resorted to Ermattungsstratégie. Vernichtungsstrategie was the order 
of the day.*”
One Norwegian doctrine claims that Delbrück correctly described manoeuvre warfare as a two- 
pole strategy, where attrition and manoeuvre constituted the poles. What the doctrine refers to, 
but fails to mention, is that this is Delbrück’s Ermattungsstrategie}^ Is manoeuvre warfare 
similar to Ermattungsstrategiel As the manoeuvrists contrast manoeuvre warfare with attrition 
warfare, and as Delbrück contmstodErmattung and Vernichtung, should one conclude that a 
Vermchtwigsstrategie is attrition warfare?
Tjostheim, writing in a Norwegian military periodical refers to the conduct of Fredrick the Great 
during the 7 Years War. He claims that during this period, manoeuvre warfare was primarily 
conducted at the strategic level. It did not contrast with attrition warfare. The strategic aim was 
to wear out the enemy, not to kill him.*  ^If attrition warfare is the same as a 
Vermchtungsstrategie, and manoeuvre warfare is Ermattungsstrategie, and as Tjostheim says,
 ^Lind, William S., Some Doctrinal Questions for The United States Army, Military Review, (January/February, 
1997), 138
® Craig, Gordon A., Delbrück; The Military Historian, in Paret, Peter, ed.. Makers o f  Modern Strategy, (New Jersey, 
1986), 341-343
 ^Rolf, Bertil, Militdr kompetens, (Falun, 1998), 349 
Craig, Delbrück, in Paret, Makers, 343
Forsvarets Overkommando, Forsvarets fellesoperative doktrine, (Oslo, 2000), 47. [Norwegian Joint Operational 
Doctrine - FFOD]
Tjostheim, Inge, Generalmajor Jolm F. C. Fuller: Det moderne mangverkrigskonseptets far, Norsk Militcer 
Tidsskrift, (10/2000), 9
attrition does not contrast with manoeuvre, what, in the end, is actually being contrasted with 
what?
Mearsheimer makes a distinction between total war and unlimited war.*^
• Total war seeks unconditional surrender and has unlimited political and military objectives. 
This involves complete defeat of the enemy armed forces in order for the attacker to impose 
his unconditional will on his opponent.
• Unlimited war seeks total defeat of enemy military forces. But it does not have to be a total 
war. The politieal objectives could be limited. If total defeat of the enemy armed forces is the 
objective, the attacker can choose between attrition and Blitzla'ieg-style warfare.
• When a belligerent is following a strategy of limited objectives, the objective is to seize a 
portion of enemy territory [i.e. limited political objective]. In order to obtain this the attacker 
must defeat at least parts of the enemy armed forces. This can also be achieved by pursuing a 
strategy of attrition or Blitzkrieg. However, according to Mearsheimer it is possible to pursue 
a third type of strategy when one seeks limited objectives. This is the limited aim strategy. It 
emphasises minimising contact with the defender. It relies largely on surprise in order to 
strike before the victim can mobilise.
Mearsheimer states that the distinction between war that seeks total defeat and partial defeat of 
the enemy is evident in Clausewitz’s writings. First, if we relate Delbrück to Mearsheimer, a 
Vernichtungsstrategie could be either total war or unlimited war with the aim of complete defeat 
of the enemy. Second, 'DoVomcWs Ermattungsstrategie seems to be similar to Mearsheimer’s 
strategy of limited objectives. Since both derive their conclusions from Clausewitz, we may 
assume that this is a correct relationship. The quadrangular relationship between manoeuvre 
warfare, the doctrine and the two authors appears then to be beyond logical comprehension.
According to Aron, Delbrück, although he was contested, seems to have arrived at a conclusion 
about the two types of strategy that was close to what Clausewitz meant. Manoeuvre could be 
related to a situation where neither belligerent sought to overthrow one another, which in fact is 
the situation the Norwegian doctrine relates to. Both belligerents sought limited objectives and to 
avoid decisive battles.*”
Mearsheimer, John J., Conventional Deterrence, (London, 1983), 29 
Ibid., 30 
Ibid., 29
Aron, Raymond, Clausewitz, Philosopher o f  War, (New Jersey, 1985), 75-76
For Clausewitz the term manoeuvre carried “the idea of an effect created out of nothing” and he 
compared it to the opening gambits in a chess game. The belligerents manoeuvred to gain an 
advantage over the enemy. Clausewitz realised that wars and campaigns evolved into decisive 
battles through manoeuvre. Manoeuvre and battle were both complementary and necessary 
means to an end. For the proponents of manoeuvre warfare, the term manoeuvre earries the idea 
of moving two pieces of chess, while the opponent only moves one.*®
1.2 Aim and scope
This study will not diseuss the attrition-manoeuvre dichotomy as such. The assumption is that 
there is no such dichotomy. We will rather discuss the definition of manoeuvre warfare, as it is 
explained in the doch ines and literature, in the context of operational art and the German 
conduct of war.
Any new mindset as to how an organisation should conduct its affairs is difficult to enforce. One 
of the most important ways of overcome this difficulty is a common understanding of terms and 
methods. According to Schnarhorst, one of the fathers of the Prussian military reforms in the 
early 19**' century, unambiguous principles and concepts that clarify the links between the parts 
of war and the whole are the basis for the formulation of a universal theory about war. The 
proper method of educating officers is first to provide them with the correct theory, and to 
encourage them to think independently and clarify their concepts.*^
The debate on manoeuvre warfare and operational art as followed in military periodicals, 
experience in joint and combined operations and exercises, and as revealed in preliminary 
studies of a number of doctrines show that the framework for a common understanding of 
manoeuvre warfare may be lacking.
Moreover, the armed forces of the western world are downsized, while the number of their 
world-wide commitments is increasing. The eonsequence is that joint and combined operations 
are playing a greater role, and in many cases are imperative for the conduct of campaigns. 
Manoeuvre warfare doctrines, through their emphasis on joint operations, should be the smaller 
forces’ solution to this development.^” But a lack of common understanding will impede co­
operation. The problem is not new. During the Second World War, when the allies did not have
Clausewitz, Carl von, Howard, Michael, Paret, Peter, eds., trans., On War, (Princeton, 1984), 541 
Uhle-Wettler, Franz, Auftragstaktik: Mission Orders and the German Experience, in Hooker, Richard D., ed..
Maneuver Warfare, An Anthology, (Novato, 1993), 238 
Gat, Azar, The Origins o f  Military Thought, From Enlightenment to Clausewitz, (Oxford, 1989), 161 
O'Neill, Richard, Modern US Army, (London, 1984), 10. Manoeuvre warfare was supposed to be the answer to 
U.S. and NATO quantitative inferiority in the prospects o f a war between the West and the Warsaw Pact in Europe.
any common operational doctrine, General Devers, Commander of the U.S. 6th Army Group, 
observed six areas as most worthy of consideration in coalition operations. These doubtless still 
apply:
(1) “Characteristic lack of clarity and firmness of directives received from the next superior 
combined headquarters or authority.
(2) The conflicting political, economic, and military problems and objectives of each of the 
allied powers.
(3) The logistical capabilities, organisations, doctrines, and characteristics of each of [the] armed 
forces under command.
(4) The armament, training, and tactical doctrines of each of the armed forces under command.
(5) Personal intervention and exercise of a direct, personal influence to assure co-ordination and 
success in the initial phases of the mission assigned by the next higher combined authority.
(6) The personalities of the senior commanders of each of the armed seivices of the allied 
powers under command, their capabilities, personal and professional habits, and their 
ambitions.” *^
It is not the aim of this thesis to prove anyone right or wrong. All the doctrines have merit in 
their own context. But as doctrines are supposed to be what is officially believed and taught 
about the best way to conduct militaiy affairs, and because they are all “gospels” of the 
manoeuvre theory, the assumption is that they should provide those who read them with common 
ground. Why is that not so? Is the manoeuvre-attrition perspective as a dichotomy 
misunderstood? Is the consequence production of doctrines that do not facilitate the cognition of 
operational art or whatever that is supposed to be? Is this cognition hampered through the use of 
selective German campaigns to exemplify manoeuvre warfare? Do the selective use and mix of 
terms and methods from German military vocabulary and classical military theory reinforce the 
confusion? Moreover, do the doctrines represent a cognitive device used to instil a particular 
theoretical mindset about war that may be as dangerously narrow as offensive à I ’outmncQ. There 
are both theoretical and historic empirical approaches to this.
Rice, Anthony J., Command and Control: The Essence of Coalition Warfare, Parameters, (spring, 1997), 160
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1.3 Method and structure
The first section of this thesis will seek to clarify what manoeuvre warfare is supposed to be. 
General systems theory and non-linear dynamics will be used to link this clarification to the 
manoeuvrist notion of operational art. Thereafter I will examine the doctrines in order to find, 
analyse and discuss those elements that may cause different interpretations. The objective is first 
to deteimine whether the methods and terms used in manoeuvre warfare doctrines conform to 
any of the theories. Second, by analysing the doctrines it will be possible to derive criteria that 
may be used to analyse the historical substantiation of manoeuvre warfare in the third section.
Several different national, alliance and service doctrines are used. As manoeuvre warfare started 
in the United States, and because of the U.S. Army’s major influence on doctrinal thinking 
among its alliance partners, emphasis is put on the main American service doctrines. The British 
also play a prominent role as a major contributor to coalition warfare. Together with many of the 
European states, Britain introduced manoeuvre warfare at a later stage. The British perspective 
on the topic is assumed to represent a matured and Eui'opean view. NATO doctrines are also 
used, assuming that they represent the alliance’s common understanding of manoeuvre warfare. 
In addition, Noi*wegian doctrinal publications are considered. As a small country Norway is 
often confronted with a dilemma as to whether to follow its own way or to conform to either the 
alliance or one of the major military nations. The doctrines considered represent all services. 
However, army doctrines are stressed. As manoeuvre warfare doctrines are supposed to express 
operational art, thus embracing joint and combined warfare, the analysis will uncover differences 
with regard to the various services and countries.
The third section in this thesis concerns the historical substantiation of manoeuvre warfare. 
Examples from German military history and theory are often used to illustrate various points on 
how to conduct manoeuvre warfare, maybe in order to substitute for the lack of explanatory 
theories in the doctrines. According to Lind, “Blitzkrieg was conceptually complete by 1918.[...] 
This is manoeuvre warfare.”^^  Was the Gennan campaign of 1940 an expression of operational 
art, thus deseiving a prominent role as a model for the explanation of manoeuvre warfare?
Lind, William S., The Origins of Maneuver Warfare and its Implications for Air Power, in Olsen, From 
Manoeuvre Warfare, 28-29. See also Higgins, George A., German and U.S. Operational Art: A Contrast in 
Manoeuvre, Military Review, (October, 1985), 24. ”[...]Blitzkrieg warfare against numerically superior Soviet 
forces on the Eastern Front was essentially a maneuver doctrine.”
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2 Manoeuvre warfare
The implementation of the Active Defence doctrine in 1976 and manoeuvre warfare revealed the 
necessity for the development of a proper terminology and theory. Not only were the answers 
sought through the study of German military history in general and German performance during 
World War II in particular. There was also, perhaps because the publication of the new doctrine 
coincided with a new translation of Clausewitz’s On War, a renewed interest in the classical 
military theories. Following the interest in Clausewitz, other military theoreticians were 
rediscovered, of which Sun Tzu, Liddell Hart and Jomini have become the most influential. 
Soviet military theory was also studied. The result of these studies is a hybrid of German military 
history and philosophy, a notion of the Napoleonic art of war, ancient Chinese wisdom, British 
common sense and Soviet military theory.
Less than ten years after the doctrinal concept was born, the first major work written on the 
subject gave both manoeuvre and attrition warfare the status of th e o ry .In  this chapter we will 
look more closely at what this might be.
2.1 The physics of manoeuvre warfare
According to authors on manoeuvre warfare, their theory, not very surprisingly perhaps, consists 
of both psychological and physiological elements. In their opinion time is the key discriminator 
between manoeuvre and attrition warfare. ’’Manoeuvre warfare is an intense contest for time.” "^* 
War is planned and executed on the basis of a preconceived appreciation of the time-distance 
relationship. Manoeuvre theory attempts to upset an enemy’s calculations of this relationship.
The authors bring up two equations from Newtonian physics in order to illustrate how a military 
force can be manipulated in the contest for time.
Momentum = Mass x Velocity
“Momentum” is a unit’s operational worth. Mass is a unit’s physical combat power. Velocity
is a vector quantity and is expressed as distance over time.^” The second equation is:
Force = Mass x Acceleration (change of rate in velocity)
Simpkin, Richard E., Race to the Swift, (London, 2000), 19 
Leonhard, Robert, The Art o f  Maneuver, (Novato, 1994), 82
Simpkin, Race to the Swift, 22. The term “combat worth” is concerned with the effects o f weapons based on 
precision, calibre, rates o f fire, quantity etc.
Mass is normally measured in weight. The manoeuvrist assumption is that more weapons and more firepower 
normally will increase a unit’s weight. See for example British Ministry of Defence, Chief o f the General Staff, The 
British Military Doctrine, Design fo r  Military Operations, (1996), chapter 4, 24. [BMD]
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“Force” is here defined as the “applied will” of the commander of a unit [i.e. it is the 
commander’s will expressed through orders that eventually will make a unit move]. Mass is 
defined as in the first equation. Acceleration is the rate of change in velocity. Acceleration then 
is the measure of how quickly a unit can change from zero velocity to its maximum velocity 
toward an objective. However, the acceleration factor’s most important feature is how quickly 
the mass can change its direction. If the mass is heading from point A to B, and suddenly is 
tasked to head towards point C, how quickly can the mass respond to the new task? When, for 
example, the German Aimy Group A poured some 40 000 vehicles into the Ardennes on 10 May 
1940, pushing the road system towards its limits, it had a very low acceleration. Any orders to 
head in a direction than the one the units were supposed to follow, would have produced a 
catastrophic traffic jam.
According to Leonhard, ’’Force” is complementai-y to “Momentum” and vice versa. If a unit [i.e. 
mass] has poor acceleration [i.e. low change in velocity], it will affect its momentum. One may 
exemplify this by a commander that can not apply his will because of an inefficient staff. This 
will cause the unit to be slow to respond [i.e. accelerate] to the commander’s orders. The applied 
will of the commander is also affected by the degree of momentum. If the staff does excellent 
work in applying the will of the commander, it will not matter if the unit is foot mobile in a high­
speed environment. Moreover, by increasing the velocity the operational worth will also be 
increased. This will also be the effect if one increases the mass. But it is important to note that 
according to manoeuvre theory an increase in the mass is not desirable. An increase is 
synonymous with an attritional approach to war. According to the proponents of manoeuvre 
warfare, the philosophy behind attrition theory is that it is aimed at the destruction of the 
enemy’s mass through the application of one’s own mass. But the enemy may be able to absorb 
the attack. By using the dynamics of velocity in accordance with the philosophy behind 
manoeuvre warfare, one aims at weaknesses in the structure of the enemy mass. One will then be 
able to penetrate deep. The penetration will ereate a greater shoek. It enables the attacker to 
destroy the enemy from within. It will overtax the enemy command and control systems. Some 
manoeuvrists claim that manoeuvre warfare is about a systemic approach.^^ The belligerents are 
systems that are made up of interrelated elements. The systems are influenced by the factors of 
mass and will, and the time/distance relationship. In eontrast, attrition warfare, the manoeuvrists 
say, is primarily concerned with mass and thus the exchange of fire.
Forsvarets overkommando, Forsvarets doktrine fo r  landoperasjoner, 3. utkast, (Oslo, 2001), 19. [Norwegian 
Doctrine for Land Operations - NDLO]
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The merging of different theories, historical experiences and philosophies into a new theory has 
created a new terminology -  or, perhaps old terminology used in a new way. Manoeuvre warfare 
is primarily based upon three interrelated concepts. The interrelation is governed by operational 
art. The concepts are:
(1) The centre of gravity
(2) Mission command
(3) Combined aims
In the next sections an explanation of each of the three concepts will be given.
2.1.1 Centre of Gravity
The term centre of gravity is taken from Clausewitz’s work, Vom Kriege, Its definition is quite 
simple and borrows from Newtonian physics.^® Clausewitz defined it as ’’the hub of all power 
and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies 
should be directed.” ”^ It is the elimination of the enemy’s and protection of one’s own that will 
lead to the successful conclusion of a war. In the German language, the term ’’centre of gravity” 
is called Schwerpunkt. Despite differences of language, one might assume that Newtonian 
physics would be applied in the same way. This may not be so.
The centre of gravity seems to be the most discussed concept among those who have adopted 
manoeuvre warfare. That the U.S. Air Force in its 1992 manual defined it as the ’’hub and power 
of all movement” instead of ’’the hub of all power and movement” may of course have 
contributed to the lack of agreement.®” We will venture into the realms of the centre of gravity 
and/or Schwerpunkt as Das Ding in sich, to use a phrase from Kant, when analysing the 
doctrines. According to the manoeuvrists, the centre of gravity is the departure point for all plans 
and the subsequent execution. Therefore, the concept is supposed to be an instrument with which 
to deteimine what it is important to protect or attack and what are the strengths and weaknesses. 
Discussions about the centre of gravity are mainly centred on whether it is something weak or 
strong, or both. Moreover, is it one or several? On what level of war is it found? Meilinger 
claims, for example, that “[c]enters of gravity can be [...] strengths, but they can also be a
Tollefsen, Torstein, et.al., Tenkere og ideer, (Oslo, 1997), 312 
Clausewitz, On War, 595-596
30 U.S. Air Force, A ¥ M \ - I , Basic Aerospace Doctrine o f  the United States Air Force, (1991), 276 [AFM 1-1]
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vulnerability.”®* How does one relate to a centre of gravity according to the manoeuvrist 
literature and doctrines?
The path to the elimination of a centre of gravity is through lines of operations. In its simplest 
form, the line is a cognitive tool, a scheme or stratagem, that helps the belligerents to determine 
the actions to be taken, phased in time and space. The concept is basically taken from Jomini’s 
work The Art o f War, although other theorists have come up with similar ideas. The term 
’’decisive points” is also of Jominian origin. Which points are decisive? Along a line of operation 
one or several events may be of such a character that the outcome results in a significant change 
in the chances of winning the war. The aim, according to some doctrines is to destroy the enemy. 
For others it is to dislocate him.®^  One can try to predetermine the point through planning. But a 
decisive point can of course be an event that was not anticipated. In the latter case one must often 
choose a new line of operation. Decisive points can for example be related to geography or to a 
single battle.®®
Two types of lines of operation have a significant importance in manoeuvre warfare. From 
Liddell Hart one has borrowed ’’the line of least resistance” and ’’the line of least expectation”,®"* 
Using one or both of these lines to approach a centre of gravity is called the ’’indirect approach”. 
If the direct approach is used, the enemy will know that you are coming. He will prepare, and the 
path will turn into one of most resistance. That will lead to a battle of attrition. Strength is 
pitched against strength. The manoeuvrist school realises of course that there are thinking 
enemies. The paradoxical logic of war sometimes leads to a situation where what one belligerent 
regards as the line of least expectation, is also regarded as such by the enemy. The belligerent 
who thought out a clever way to surprise his enemy may then be surprised himself. ®® The 
solution to this problem was found in ancient Chinese wisdom. Sun Tzu, who lived some 2000 
years ago, developed the idea of the ’’ordinary force” and ’’extraordinary force”.®” The 
extraordinary force was a more mobile and agile force than the ordinary. By using the less 
mobile ordinary force one could fix the enemy to his position. One could convince him that the 
ordinary force was the most important to destroy. It then functioned as ’’The Matador’s Cloak” to
Meilinger, Phillip S., Air Strategy -  Targeting for Effect, Aerospace Power Journal, (winter 1999), 48 
See for example NDLO, 22-23 and U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations, (1993), 2-4. See also Leonhard, 
Robert, The Principles o f  War fo r  the Information Age, (Novato, 2000), 64, for positional, functional, temporal and 
moral dislocation.
Jomini, Antoine Henri de. The Art o f  War, (London, 1992), 85-86 
Liddell Hart, Basil Henry, Strategy, (New York, 1968), 348
Luttwak, Edward N., Strategy, The Logic o f War and Peace, (Massachusetts, 1987), 18 
Simpkin, Race to the Swift, 37
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use an expression from Liddell Hart/^ In such situations one created the opportunity of using a 
line of least expectation, and even that of least resistance. While the ordinary force was busy 
fighting the enemy, the extraordinary force could make an unexpected move and attack the 
enemy from behind or on his flanks. The enemy who let himself be fooled would of course have 
an attritional approach to war. The indirect approach seemed to fit the physics of war. By 
choosing a line of least resistance or least expectation it is possible to increase the momentum. 
Because of less resistance one can travel greater distances over time. There is a greater velocity. 
“Momentum” is complementary to ’’Force”, the applied will of the commander. The 
manoeuvrists increase ’’Force” and aceelerate faster through the use ofAuftragstaktilU, or 
literally mission command.
2.1.2 Mission Command
"Theirs not to make reply. Theirs not to reason why.
Theirs but to do and die. "
The manoeuvrists claim that the idea of directive control is derived from German military 
culture,®  ^Mission command implies that the commander should issue general directives, rather 
than orders. Within an agreed framework, he leaves the subordinate free to ehoose the means and 
methods he wants in order to achieve a satisfactory end state. The formulated end-state expresses 
the commander’s intention; hence the subordinates’ guidance is the intention."*” As opposed to a 
detailed order on what to do and how to do it, a shorter statement on what end state one wishes to 
achieve saves time."** Less time is lost on maldng and disseminating elaborate plans and 
operation orders. Accordingly, this allows subordinates, and the unit as a whole to operate faster 
and with greater agility than the enemy does. It keeps the enemy off balance and he is unable to 
respond coherently. The method of mission command will, theoretically, increase the factor 
“Force”, the applied will of the commander. The commander does not need a large staff to work 
out his orders. A short statement of what he wants lets the executor start almost immediately.
Liddell Hart, Basil Henry, The Other Side o f the Hill, (London, 1978), 159
Alfi-ed Lord Tennyson, "Charge o f the Light Brigade" in Wintle, Justin, ed.. The Dictionary? o f  War Quotations, 
(London, 1989), 276
The term “directive control”, “mission tactics “, “mission command” and ''AuftragstaMlC are the four different 
terms to express the same phenomenon. Simpkin, Race to the Swift, 228-229, proposes the use of directive control as 
he sees some linguistic implications o f directly translating Auftragstaktik into English.
Lind, William S., Maneuver Warfare Handbook, (Boulder, 1985), 30
The manoeuvrist notion on what orders in the attrition environment are, seems to be somewhat misplaced. See for 
example Kommanderende General, Kompaniets utdannelse istrid , (Oslo, 1926), 23, Forsvarets overkommando, 
Ordregivningp à  kompani og troppsnivâ, (Oslo, 1978), 6, Hastens Overkommando, Stabshandbokfor Hœren, (Oslo, 
1966), Chapter 4. There are no differences between the manoeuvrists and these pre-manoeuvre era publications 
regarding the definition and the purpose o f orders and directives. That one resorted to detailed orders on what and 
how to do it, in the pre-manoeuvre era are rather expressions of a cultural trend and the fact that most nations based 
its armed forces on conscripts.
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The manoeuvrist proponents emphasise that the subordinates must know the intentions of the 
commander two levels up/^ By knowing the higher echelon’s intention, the subordinate will be 
able not only to accomplish missions given by his immediate superior, but also in some 
circumstances to accomplish or enliance the chances for accomplishment of the mission of his 
superior two levels up. The commander’s intent should also be a statement of the desired effect 
upon the enemy force. Departing from the attritionist axiom that conquering terrain is an 
important criterion for success, the manoeuvrists claim that the “[t]he emphasis is on the defeat 
and dismption of the enemy rather than attempting to hold or take ground for its own sake.”"*® 
The “acceleration” is theoretically increased because the executor relates to what the commander 
wants to accomplish in relation to the enemy. If the executor has to wait for new orders every 
time the enemy changes his disposition, it reduces his ability to accelerate. By knowing the 
intention two levels up, the executor is able to increase the acceleration even further. Thus we 
get a notion of synergetic effects.
The underlying theory regarding directive control is the OODA-loop."*"* It is essentially based on 
the obseivations of a fighter pilot in aerial combat during the Korean War. The OODA-loop is 
the cycle a human goes through when interacting with his environment. The person Observes.
He then Orients. In this phase he determines what is observed and what options are available. He 
then makes a Decision on what to do, and finally he Acts. This cycle is continuously repeated as 
part of human nature and man’s interaction with the environment. The enemy with a slower 
OODA-loop becomes reactive. The manoeuvrists use the theory in an organisational/systemic 
context. The organisation that goes through the cycle the fastest will, over time, create a growing 
gap between its actions and the enemy’s reaction. The Boyd cycle is a subset of acceleration. An 
improvement in the ability to cycle through the OODA-loop will increase the ability to 
accelerate.
Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, 13. See also U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations,, 6-6, [FM 100-5] 
and Beaumont, Roger, The Nerves o f  War, (Washington 1986), 48, 75. Beaumont refers to the Russians in relation 
to the idea of knowing the intention two levels up.
BMD, chapter 4, 56. See also FFOD, 100 
Beckerman, Linda, P., The Non-Linear Dynamics o f War, (1999), 
http://www.belisarius.com/modem_business_strategy/beckerman/non_linear.htm
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Figure 1: OODA-loop
Mission command also stimulates the creativity of the subordinate. The subordinate is the one 
who is supposed to know the environment he is to operate in best. Thus he knows best how to 
accomplish his mission. The degree of freedom enjoyed by the subordinate may also expresses 
the manoeuvrists' view of the intellects of the armed forces. An American training manual from 
1951, a time when the U.S. Army is supposed to have had an attritionist approach, says on the 
need to keep orders simple: ”It is said that General Grant had a certain captain on his staff with 
whom he discussed his most important orders before issuing them. He explained, [...] that he 
considered this captain so ’’dumb” that he felt confident that any order clear to the captain could 
not fail to be understood by anyone.”"*®
This passage illustrates a view of the lower ranks common in many armed forces throughout the 
centuries. In the German case, some contemporary Germans oXmm, Auftragstaktik grew out of 
social reforms in the 19**’ century. "*” It is linked to what the Germans today call Innere Fiihrung. 
This is the image of the man as a free person. The dignity and rights of liberty of all citizens, and 
therefore all soldiers, are respected. Through the commitment to the moral-ethical standards of 
society, the soldier recognises that the values of the community have to be defended. In order to 
QmpXoy Auftragstaktik successfully as part of the manoeuvrist culture, soldiers must be
U. s. A'my, The Essentials o f  Military Training, (1951), 52 
Uhle-Wettler, Aufti'agstaktik, in Hooker, Maneuver Warfare, 240-241.
18
committed to values of their society/^ The Germans pvX Auftragstaktik into a broader context 
and it becomes an ethical issue. It deviates from the manoeuvrists of other countries, who tend to 
put mission command in relation to certain personality traits. In their view, the soldiers must 
express self-confidence, stamina and the desire to accomplish missions. They must also have an 
offensive spirit, be intuitive, aggressive and willing to take risks. Not showing initiative is 
unacceptable."*® Another aimy in a not so distant past once wanted soldiers that looked upon war 
as "an exhilarating experience approached with relish, an opportunity to master fear and 
transcend bodily limits, the ultimate virile sport, a supreme fulfilment of one’s self.”"*^
Mission command may have a synergetic effect. The notion of synergy will be taken a bit further 
when we look at the manoeuvrists’ relation to firepower and combined arms.
2.1.3 Combined Arms
The manoeuvrists do not agi'ee on the importance of firepower. One doctrine for example, claims 
that all wars involve the use of both firepower and mobility. But what characterises the 
attritionist approach to war is its reliance on firepower at the expense of mobility. In manoeuvre 
warfare it is the other way around.®” Some manoeuvrists claim that firepower is very important, 
“Some people have accused maneuver warfare advocates of downgrading the importance of 
firepower. Nothing could be further from the truth.”®* The issue is the purposes for which 
firepower is used.
On the physical level, manoeuvre warfare is concerned with the interaction between mass, time 
and space. The increase of the mass will lead to an increase in firepower. There will be more and 
heavier weapons.®  ^ However, according to the manoeuvrists, this will primarily be useful when 
applied in relation to an attack on the principal enemy mass. That is what they should avoid 
attacking. In attrition warfare a unit manoeuvres on the battlefield in order to get in a better firing 
position. Firepower is applied with the purpose of reducing the number of enemy troops and 
equipment. In manoeuvre warfare it is the opposite. A unit uses firepower in order to manoeuvre. 
Apparently, firepower is used to enhance the dynamism of velocity. By fire and manoeuvre one 
seeks to create a series of unexpected and dangerous situations for the enemy.®® This implies
Widder, Werner, Auftragstaktik and innere Fiihrung: Trademarks o f German Leadership, Military Review, 
(September-October 2002), 5 
Hooker, Richard D., Implementing Manoeuvre Warfare, in Hooker, Maneuver Warfare, 227 
Gat, Azar, Fascist and Liberal Visions o f  War, (New York, 1988), 82 
FFOD, 47
Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, 19
Creveld, Martin van, Air Power and Maneuver Warfare, (Alabama, 1994), 15. According to Creveld’s studies, a 
force designed to be agile and to conduct high tempo operations will require a smaller logistical tail.
Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, 19
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however that the enemy must perceive the manoeuvring units as capable of delivering some life- 
threatening fire, and that the enemy is not very willing to die for what he believes in. This does 
not seem to be a matter of concern.
Manoeuvre warfare “is joint and combines the resources of all arms and services.” ®"* Based on 
this Leonliard presents the “Combined Arms Theory”. This theory contains a dialectic between a 
“complementary” and a “dilemma” principle. ®® The complementary principle states that by 
combining the various combat arms into a single organisation, one can compensate for each 
arm’s weakness through another arm’s strength. The dynamics of the complementary 
relationship are aimed at nullifying one’s own weaknesses by the combination of arms. The 
dilemma principle expresses the notion that through proper employment of various combat aims 
serves to complement each other with respect to the enemy [i.e. in order for the enemy to defend 
himself from one arm, he may become vulnerable to another]. According to Leonhard, in order 
to reduce the amount of attrition, the combination of arms must be synergistic. If both the enemy 
and one’s own forces nullify their weaknesses, victory will go to the belligerent with the most 
resources.
2.2 Conclusion
The three concepts put less emphasis on imposing order on the battlefield. War is accepted as 
fluid, chaotic and non-linear. ®” However, the British Army’s manoeuvre doctrine does not agree 
entirely on this. Accordingly, ”[t]o succeed, an Aimy needs to be able to create order out of the 
chaos of war.”®^ But for most manoeuvrists, chaos and fluidity in war should be utilised through 
the proper application of operational art. This has validity in any type of conflict from low 
intensity wars to the nuclear battlefield.®®
3 Operational art
The prevailing view among the manoeuvrists is that attrition warfare is essentially linear and that 
manoeuvre warfare is non-linear. But the manoeuvrists discuss the features of non-linearity in 
several dimensions. Leonhard, for example, claims that: ’’Non-linearity, [...], is at best a false
BMD, chapter 4, 56
Leonhard, The Art o f  Maneuver, 91. See also Luttwak, Strategy, 29
See for example U.S. Marine Coips, Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting, (1997), 9, Lind, Maneuver Warfare 
Handbook, 1, and FFOD, 53
BMD, chapter 4, 3. See also Creveld, Martin van. Command in War, (Massachusetts, 1985), 183. “Where the 
British [...] feared disorder o f all things, the Germans accepted it as inevitable and sought to circumvent the 
problem by putting a heavy emphasis on independent action by subordinate commanders and even by individual 
men.”
Downing, Wayne A., Firepower, Attrition, Maneuver, U.S. Array Operations Doctrine: A Challenge for the 1980s 
and Beyond, Military Review, (January/February, 1997), 149. See also FFOD, 50
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goal and at worst a failure to appreciate the geometry of war.”®^ Accordingly, manoeuvre 
warfare is obviously linear. Leonhard regards non-linearity as totally meaningless. He also 
claims that within manoeuvre theory one uses lines of length, lines of width and lines of 
operations. To emphasise non-linearity is identical to fighting wars with many unrelated battles 
with small, umelated units.”” Creveld claims that manoeuvre warfare is thrust line oriented, with 
wide, and often unequal and variable gaps between the attacking thrusts. However, he also 
claims that attrition warfare is linearly oriented, with units packed closely together and with 
flanks tied in tightly.”' In this thesis non-linearity has nothing to do with these authors’ 
understandings of the term. It is not about the geometrical features of linear formations. Nor is it 
about mathematical formulas, such as those Bülow proposed in the Spirit o f  the Modern Systems 
o f War in 1799. He claimed that success depended upon a maximum angle of 90 degrees 
between the base, objective and unit’s line of operation.”^  In this thesis linearity will be related 
to general systems theory and non-linear dynamics.
3.1 General system  theory and non-linear dynamics
In general systems theory one differs between open and closed systems. A closed system does 
not interact, nor is it affected by circumstances outside itself.”® Open systems engage in 
interchanges with the environment. The interchange is essential for the systems’ viability.”"* 
Organisations, for example the belligerents in a conflict, deal with the interrelation of a great 
number of variables, which occur in the fields of politics, economics, industry, commerce, 
militaiy conduct etc.
According to Bertalanffy, systems have three parameters in common:
• the quantitative, which is concerned with the number of elements in the system as a whole;
• the material parameter is concerned with the type of species within the system as a whole;
and
• the qualitative, which relates to the attributes in the relations of the elements.”®
All elements have certain characteristics and behaviours, which are the same both inside and 
outside a system as long as there are no interactions. The certain characters and behaviour are
Leonhard, The Art o f  Maneuver, 90 
‘^ Hbid., 194
Creveld, Air Power and Maneuver warfare, 9 
Gat, The Origins o f  Military Thought, 81
Rossvær, Tore, Organisasjonsteorier i sosiologisk belysning, (Oslo, 1987), 93
Scott, Ricliai'd W., Organizations: Rational, N atw al and Open Systems, (New Jersey, 1992), 76
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dependent upon what species they are. With no interaction the characters and behaviour are 
called summative and obey the mle of additivity. Theoretically, this is a linear system.
The essence of the system centres on the existence of an interaction. Each element within the 
system has constitutive characteristics/behaviour in addition to its above mentioned summative 
characteristics/behaviours. Constitutive characteristics are those which are dependent on the 
specific interaction within the system.”” Interaction means that the elements within a system 
become inputs to each other. The product that results from the interactions between the elements 
is called “emergent behaviour”.
Emergent behaviour is the collective behaviour that results from interactions between elements, 
whose individual behaviour is other than the emergent behaviour.
In non-linear systems, the emergent behaviour will be either greater or lesser than if each 
individual behaviour is added together. This can be achieved by changing the interaction through 
control parameters. Synchronisation is such a control parameter. A high degree may lead to a 
situation where there are fewer available options for the system. If one species/element is slower, 
the other must wait. The slowness becomes an input to the other elements. On the other side, no 
synchronisation may lead to chaos. The control parameters determine a system’s state. It affects 
the inputs that perturb the interactions within the system. In the context of war there is no such 
thing as a linear system. However, there are greater or lesser degi*ees of linear actions and 
thinking.
The manoeuvrists claim that attrition warfare occurs when a belligerent system assumes that 
combat power is directly proportional to the number of combatants and their weapons. The 
attritionists then express linear thinking. In Clausewitz’s words, “[t]hat would be a kind of war 
by algebra. Theorists were already beginning to think along such lines when the recent wars 
taught them a lesson.””®According to Beckerman, it is also linear thinking when a military force 
introduces a new weapon system to create an effect that is equivalent to several other older 
weapon systems.”” The introduction of “Smart” bombs versus “Dumb” bombs may illustrate 
Beckerman’s point. Linearity is also the case if the system continues to act in the same way, 
regardless of a change in the enemy’s behaviour. Luttwak illustrates an extreme form of this. 
“For a primitive tribe whose entire force consists of identically armed warriors who always fight
Bertalanffy, Ludwig von, General System Theory, (New York, 2003), 54-55. For the purpose o f  this thesis 
systems and organisations are the same, Bertalanffy also uses the term “complex”.
Bertalanffy, General System Theory, 55 
67 Beckerman, The Non-Linear Dynamics, 3. The term "agent” is used instead o f "element”.
Clausewitz, On War, 76
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ill a single formation, the tactical operational, and strategic must coincide for all practical 
purposes. Such a tribe cannot suffer a tactical defeat that is not also strategic, nor can it develop a 
method of war that is more than tactic.” The manoeuvrist often uses the U.S. Armed Force’s 
”body-count” during the Vietnam War is an example of linear and attritional thinking. Success 
is measured in quantitative results, regardless of a change in enemy behaviour. According to 
Senge this occurs because we tend to view the environment as linear chains of cause and effect.^^ 
We think that the result of our action is the direct effect on the adversary. But that is only part 
truth. The result of our action also affects his adaptation to our actions and the subsequent action 
he himself chooses.
A non-linear system is able to exhibit multiple stable states. Upon perturbation, the system has 
the ability to bifurcate into multiple states of which each can be stable. However, the number of 
possible stable states for a non-linear system is limited. Further bifurcation will eventually lead 
towards chaos and instability. This could for example happen if there was a dramatic change in 
the interconneetions of the system. A formal hierarchical system that transforms itself into a 
matrix could experience these problems. Between the multi-stable and the chaotic region is what 
Beckerman calls the “opportunistic region” [i.e. “The Edge of Chaos”]. It is so called because 
there are so many stable states available. This region can be reached by changing the intensity of 
the control parameters, such as a reduction of synchronisation. The control parameter is that 
which determines how many states there are available. In relation to the OODA-loop, the 
assessment of the availability of states occurs in the orientation phase. The recognition of the 
actual situation determines the decision as to what to do. The decision leads to an interaction that 
changes the structure.
Beckerman, The Non-Linear Dynamics, 2 
™ Luttwak, Strategy, 92
FFOD, 118, 47. The adherence to “body counts” can also be found in manoeuvre doctrines. FFOD says for 
example that end-states must be described with concrete and quantifiable criteria.
Senge, Peter M., Den femte disiplin, (Oslo, 1999), 81
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One critical factor is the system’s ability to recognise an actual situation. That is a matter of 
intelligence. However, one can have near perfect intelligence of the enemy dispositions, but 
never on what he thinks, although that might be reflected by his dispositions.^^ It is possible to 
assume that the type of technical intelligence assets that are preferred by the western military 
would lead towards a mono-stable state. They enhance the ability to act in a certain pattern, 
which is the destruction of targets. That seems to be contrary to the manoeuvrist approach. And 
because war aims to achieve asymmetries in different fields, an enemy will adapt to this sort of 
threat.
The other critical factor is the interdependence within the systems. Synchronisation will also lead 
towards a mono-stable state. General Short, whose staff prepared the Air Tasking Order 24 hours 
in advance during the air campaign against Serbia in 1999, could not easily task aircraft to please 
SACEUR’s immediate wishes. Within the time perspective at this level in the hierarchy. General 
Short’s air organisation was closer to a mono-stable state when tasked to attack the tanks Clark
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saw on his monitor. The task given by the commander also reveals a rather linear way of 
thinking.
3.2 Closing In on Operational Art
Naveh relates general systems theory to a military system. '^* The nature of traditional military 
systems is that of a hierarchical structure. This leads to a columnar mode of interaction between 
the system’s elements, or between the sub-systems within the overall system. This means that the 
emergent behaviour is determined by and develops from the rear/depth towards the front. It does 
so in an interdependent sequential mode through the echelons. A militaiy system then has two 
distinct characteristics:
• The first characteristic is that of succession and echelonment.
• The second characteristic is the absolute dominance of the system’s aim.
According to Naveh, “[t]he definition of the aim is the cognitive force that generates the system 
and determines the directions and patterns of its a c t io n .T h e  aim provides the system with its 
unifying determinant and creates cohesion. In order to get the system into the desired direction, 
the aim must be translated to concrete objectives for the individual elements within the system. 
However, the foiTnulation of aims and objectives creates what he calls cognitive tension between 
the abstract direction of the system’s overall aim and the concrete actions the elements have to 
perform in order to achieve their own objectives. Bertalanffy explains this:
“The positive progress of the system is possible only by passing from a state of undifferentiated 
wholeness to differentiation of parts. This implies, however, that the parts become fixed with 
respect to a certain action. Therefore, progressive segregation also means progressive 
mechanization. [This] implies the loss of regulability. As long as a system is a unitary whole, a 
disturbance will be followed by the attainment of a new [...] state. If, however the system is split 
up into independent causal chains, regulability disappears. The partial processes will go on 
irrespective of each other.
Naveh obseiwes that the cognitive tension between the abstract aim and concrete actions exists at 
every level in the hierarchy. The lower down one comes, or the more specialised the elements
Handel, Michael I., Masters o f  War, (London, 2001), 238. According to Handel there is an irony in that “obtaining 
accurate information on one’s own forces is the most challenging aspect” o f the observation phase. See also Handel, 
Michael I., Intelligence and Militaiy Operations, (London, 1990), 59 
Naveh, Shimon, In Pursuit o f  Militaiy Excellence, (Oregon, 1997), 5, 17 
Ibid., 5-6. See also Senge, Den femte disiplin, 355
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are, the more will they identify themselves with their immediate objective and less with the aim 
of the system as the whole. “Increasing meehanization means increasing determination of 
elements to functions only dependent on themselves[.]”^^ . A unit’s or a soldier’s immediate 
objective becomes increasingly fused with the physical action that must be done to achieve that 
objective. At the same time a greater distance between the strategic and tactical levels develops. 
This implies progressive centralisation According to Naveh, the loss of regulability will for a 
traditional militaiy system require a hierarchical structured plan. Every step in the planning 
process becomes dependent upon the hierarchical level above.
Naveh relates these processes to the field of strategy. Strategy requires creative vision and exists 
primarily in the field of the abstract [i.e. formulation of a future end state]. In contrast, tactics 
require physical action and are mostly mechanistic. It is held to the requirements of the existing 
reality. The existence of a “cognitive tension” between strategic abstraction and tactical 
mechanisation is a dichotomy of perspective. According to Naveh, appreciating this tension is 
fundamental to understanding the operational level. Because of the tension between the tactical 
and the strategic, the operational level concerns itself with the “ preservation of a controlled 
disequilibrium between the general aim and the specific missions. Only on this level can the 
abstract and mechanical extremes be fused into a functional foimula.^^
It appears then that this formula is about the preseiwation of regulability for one’s own forces 
with the aim of disrupting the regulability in the enemy system. This implies splitting up the 
enemy system into independent causal chains. The partial processes of the element will then go 
on irrespective of each other. In other words, the enemy system as a whole is forced towards a 
mono-stable state with its independent parts fighting um'elated tactical battles.
If we relate this to the concepts of manoeuvre warfare the formula could be expressed as follows:
• The elements, the species and the interaction must be linlced to one’s own “hub of all power 
and movement” [i.e. centre of giavity]. The aim is the elimination of the opponent’s. It 
becomes the “conceptual denominator common to all numerous participators of the 
operational process.” ®^
Bertalanffy, General System Theory, 70 
Ibid., 69
Naveh, In Pursuit, 18 
™ Ibid.,7. Naveh touches upon directive control to a very limited degree.
Ibid., 15
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• The emergent behaviour of the system must be based on its ability to control the 
disequilibrium between the system’s overall aim and the sub-system’s objectives. The 
manoeuvrists use directive control to achieve this.
• The elements and species must have mass and velocity corresponding to the combined arms 
theoiy.
In the next section we will investigate how the doctrines and the manoeuvrist authors define and 
relate to operational art.
3.3 Operational Art and Doctrines
According to the advocates of manoeuvre warfare the traditional western style of warfare has not 
been an expression of operational art. Rather the style of warfare has been about accumulating 
tactical victories in order to attain strategic objectives. Battles have been given where and 
whenever they have been offered. Lind exemplifies operational art as using tactical events to 
strike directly at the enemy’s strategic centre of gravity. “For the commander, it is the art of 
deciding where and when to fight on the basis of the strategic plan.”^^  Lind illustrates this with 
an example from the German campaign in France 1940: ’’Guderian looked beyond his immediate 
tactical situation to see that a victory against the French to his south meant nothing, while a 
successful advance to the west meant everything. He linked his tactical to his strategic situation 
in such a way as to see what future tactical actions he should take. He used the tactical event -  
the crossing of the Meuse - strategically, and decided what tactical actions to take -  where to 
fight and whether to fight -  on a strategic basis.” We will look more into Guderian’s actions 
below.
There are three main aspects of operational art. The first aspect is about defining the levels of 
war within a system. Which level, if any, is conducting operational art? The second is how one 
can define the interface between them. The challenge is the dialeetic of thinking that must occur 
on the operational level in relation to tactics and strategy. But this appears to be a problem 
because there is a rather indiscriminate use of the term “stratégie”. The third, which we have 
already touched upon, is the how to express and apply the theoretical mechanism into military 
doctrines.
The 1982 version of FM 100-5 introduced the tenu operational level. In the 1986 version, the divisions o f war 
included military strategy, operational art and tactics. All the doctrines used in this thesis define the operational 
level, but not all touch upon operational art.
Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, 24
Ibid. 24
The doctrines refer to six different strategic levels; Grand, national, political, national military, military and just 
strategic level. There are also operational, theatre, grand tactical, tactical, and technical levels.
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3.3.1 Levels and Interface
For the purposes of this thesis, the grand strategic level is concerned with the application of 
national resources, both military and non-military, to achieve policy objectives. According to the 
doctrines, it is the exclusive province of governments.^^ The link, so to speak, between the grand 
strategic and the operational level, is the military strategic le v e l .A t this level, armed forces are 
deployed and employed within an overreaching political framework and in a synchronised 
fashion with other non-military initiatives in order to achieve the grand strategic objectives. This 
level identifies and sets military strategic objectives.^^ It follows from this that the employment 
of armed forces through planning, setting of operational objectives and execution of campaigns 
is addressed at the operational level. According to the European and NATO doctrines, this must 
contribute directly towards achieving the military strategic objectives.^^ In the American 
doctrines, the operational level is concerned with achieving strategic objectives. Tactics is the 
employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in 
relation to each other, the terrain and the enemy to translate combat power into victorious battles 
and engagements in order to achieve objectives set at the operational level.^^
The doctrines express a strong and obvious cognition that the grand strategic level governs the 
use of military force. Whereas the cognition of this subordination is obvious, the doctrines are 
vaguer when it comes to the interface and interaction with other non-militaiy means. The 
descriptions found on operational art resemble more that of Jomini’s grand tactics, which ”[...] 
is the art of making good combinations preliminary to battles, as well as during their progress. 
The guiding principle in tactical combinations, as in those of strategy is to bring the mass of the 
force in hand against a part of the opposing army, and upon that point the possession of which 
promises the most important result.”
Naveh has a more theoretical view. Strategy and tactics strive, through the calculated investment 
of resources and optimisation of their employment, to support the politician’s intention to 
produce a new reality. Operational art interprets, through dialectical thinldng, the military 
implications from the political decisions, and initiates future situations that lead to the
BMD, chapter 4, 7. See also FFOD, 37 and FM 100-5, 6-1.
The military strategic level is only used in the European doctrines. In the U.S. national military strategy is 
addressed at the Joint Chief o f Staff. See for example Joint Chiefs o f Staff, Joint Warfare o f  the Armed Forces o f  the 
United States, JP-1, (2000), IV-3. [JP-1]
NATO, AJP-Ol(B), Allied Joint Doctrine, (2000), 2-1. [AJP-Ol(B)]
AJP-Ol(B), 2-2. See also NATO, AJP-3, Allied Joint Operations, Ratification Draft, (2000), 1-3. [AJP-3], FFOD, 
36 and BMD, chapter 4, 8 
U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-90, Tactics, (2001), 1. [FM 3-90]. FM 100-5, 6-3 
Jomini, The Art o f War, 178. See also 69-70 and FM 100-5, GIossary-6
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materialisation of the desired reality.^' Naveh’s interpretation does not pin operational art to a 
specific military decision level, which seems to be the case in the doctrines. But it is not apparent 
whether the desired reality extends beyond the effects that are produced on the opponent’s armed 
forces, or if his definition involves the investment or employment of other than pure military 
means.
However, McCormick takes the view that operational art, in addition to the application of forces 
in the field, also ties together a nation's ability to generate and field an army. It includes 
production capacity, working population, natural resources, infrastmcture and mobilisation 
procedures.G reer takes this further, and proposes that operational art must also be integrated 
with diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts.^^ These views are noteworthy because the 
perspective is broader than in most doctrines and in the literature.
The distinction between the levels of war and its relationship with operational art is not clear.
The views on how operational ait should be applied make an even more confusing picture.
3.3.2 The Syncopation Theory
According to Sun Tzu, there are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these 
give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. '^* Depending on one’s taste in music of 
course, the Chinese gives a good metaphor for the area around the “opportunistic” and “chaotic” 
regions of the bifurcation figure. Each of the melodies could represent a system’s stable state.
Lind is of the opinion that the approach to war should, ’’instead of being an orchestra with a 
score, [...] be like a jazz group jamming. He relates this metaphor to the use of directive 
control. ’’The Geiman army has used mission-type orders for over a century, yet it has not been 
an army that was out of control”^^  Control is replaced with guidance, while the intent and the 
mission glue the force together. In his view, one does not need detailed orders. Detailed planning 
and orders are a means to synchronise units. “Concepts that contradict [manoeuvre warfare] -  
such as ’’synchronization,” [...] must fall out, because the nature of war simply will not admit
Naveh, In Pursuit, 306. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 366. Grand Strategy is guided by the wish for a new reality; “a 
better peace”.
McCormick, Michael, The New FM 100-5, A Return to Operational Aid, M ilitaiy Review, (September-October 
2002, 1997), II
Greer, J. K., Operational Art for the Objective Force, Military Review, (September-October 2002), 24 
Tzu, Sun, Bookman, Harald, trans., Kunsten a huge, (Oslo, 1999), 44 
Lind, The Origins o f Maneuver Warfare, in Olsen, From Manoeuvre Warfare, 29 
Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, 14
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them. Something that is dominated by surprise, rapid change, and friction cannot be 
synchronized.”^^
On the other hand, NATO and the U.S. Army are of the opinion that “[w]hile speed is often 
preferred, commanders adjust tempo to ensure synchronisation.”^^  A somewhat less rigid view is 
also expressed. For example, a “hasty attack occurs in a meeting engagement and is launched 
with minimum preparation and it [...] enhances agility at the risk of losing synchronization.”^^ . 
The difference in the approach is also reflected in their views on planning. FM 100-5 states that 
“commanders conduct detailed initial planning.”*®^ This would of course lead to a longer 
orientation phase. On the other side, the British doctrine states that “[t]he recourse to detailed 
orders should be the exception.”^^  ^However, the British do not think that there is conflict in this. 
Accordingly, “[sjynchronisation is the key to successful offensive operations.”^^  ^According to 
AJP-Ol-(B), “[...] to derive the potential synergy for the successful prosecution of joint 
operations, synchronisation [...] is of paramount importance.” This doctrine’s view is that 
potential responses to synchronised manoeuvres can create an agonising dilemma for the 
adversary. As we have seen fi om the theory of non-linearity quite the opposite is the case. More 
synchronisation means fewer available options. Fewer options or states available for a system 
mean fewer dilemmas for its enemy. But synchronisation is a means for concentration, and 
theoretically, it contrasts with the idea of presenting the enemy with a dilemma.
The manoeuvrists also mix the temi synchronisation with simultaneity. According to Leonhard, 
“[...] simultaneity is extremely difficult to execute. The amount of planning and supervision 
over the [...] operations threatens to overtax the friendly commander more than it will the enemy 
[...] The time to plan such efforts will necessarily add to planning time, hence reducing 
acceleration and force.
Lind, The Theoiy and Practice o f Maneuver Warfare, in Hooker, Maneuver Warfare, 8. There are of course other 
opinions. See for example: Rippe, Stephen T., Firepower and Maneuver: The British and the Germans, Military 
Review, (October, 1985), 32. “The German leaders were masters at the synchronized concentration o f combat 
power.” See also Burton, J, G., Pushing them out the Back Door, Naval Proceedings, (June 1993), 37-42. During the 
1991 Gulf War, General Franks was preoccupied to” [...] align his forces in complex maneuvers to keep them 
synchronized.” It was ”a matter o f timing and synchronization.” “[IJnstead of cutting off RG’s escape his carefully 
synchronized ’’three divisions first” literally pushed the Republican Guard out of the theater back to Iraq.”
FM 100-5, 7-3, Tempo is defined as: ”[...] the rate o f speed o f  military action; controlling or altering that rate is 
essential fo r  maintaining the initiative.”, 7-2.
Ibid., 7-5
Ibid., 7-1
BMD, Annex B, 3
British Ministry of Defence, Chief o f the General Staff, Army Doctrinal Publication Volume I, Operations, 
(1994), sections 0441, 0434. [ADP]
AJP-Ol(B), 4-9
Leonhard, The Aid o f  Maneuver, 175
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What seems to be the case is a totally different perspective with regard to the levels of war and 
the time-space relationship. The issue in this debate is not whether one should be “jamming”, or 
letting musicians without any sense of rhythm play under the supervision of a rigid conductor. 
The conductor’s role in eveiy orchestra is to put his interpretation of the piece of music into the 
plan of the composer. He is so to speak the “input” to the musicians. He lets the individual 
musician, or a group within the orchestra, know when to play pianissimo or fortissimo and when 
to make notes longer or shorter than they appear on the paper.
First, the jazz metaphor seems to express a view contrary to the standards of modem/««ere 
Führung. Jamming is about musicians who during the course of their performance find supreme 
fulfilment of one’s self in being more virtuous than the preceding solo-player. They joyfully live 
off and nourish their creativity by their colleagues’ performance. Initially this does not seem to 
have anything to do with the issue. But in contrast to the creativity of jazz, war lives off and 
nourishes itself from destmction. A dilemma therefore arises. How much control is necessary to 
achieve the overall aim, and at the same time limit the “destmctive creativity” of those trying to 
achieve the objectives? According to the general system theory, jazz jamming would express 
progressive segregation with the consequence of loss of regulability. Positive segregation also 
means that there is an increasing determination on part of the elements to function entirely 
independent of o th e rs .T h e  musicians [i.e. soldiers] are likely, in Geyer’s words, to show a 
more machine-oriented behaviour, optimising their immediate objective of destruction.^®^ If 
operational art is about more than Jominian grand tactics, the disequilibrium is the contrast 
between the desire for a better peace and the objectives of destruction. This implies controlled 
aggression. Does Grossman’s view that Aiiftragstaktik empowers aggressive behaviour from 
subordinates by increasing the leader’s demands for killing behaviour enhance the possibility for 
a better peace?
A different perspective is to look upon war and operational art as an orchestra playing 
Tschaikowsky’s “7572” overtu re .A nother term from the world of music could then be 
introduced: syncopate. Simpkin expresses the notion behind syncopate and its relation to 
simultaneity. ’’The common factor is not chronometric time but the time needed to complete the 
[OODA-loop]. The Russians evidently regard two actions as exerting simultaneous pressure if
Bertalanffy, Genera! System Theoiy, 69
Gayer, Michael, German Strategy in the Age o f Machine Warfare, in Paret, Makers, 543 
Grossman, David A., Defeating the Enemy’s Will, The Psychological Foundations o f Maneuver Warfare, in 
Hooker, Maneuver Warfare, 178
The use of the term ’’orchestration” is used by some doctrines. See for example AJP-3, 3-4. and ADP, section 
0318
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one follows the other within the enemy’s response time at the level affected.” According to 
Naveh, “[t]he simultaneous operation along the rival system’s entire depth [brought] forth the 
principle of initiative, which in its turn illuminated the operational idea of synergy or synergy 
deprivation by means of fragmentation. And finally, the combinations of various operational 
elements, manoeuvring simultaneously along different fields of time and space, emphasised both 
the principle of momentum and the need for synchronisation.
Leonhard’s most serious objection to Naveh’s and Simpkin’s view is that it violates one of the 
most important principles of manoeuvre theory, which is attacking weakness instead of strength. 
“By simultaneously attacking all elements of an enemy formation, we are ignoring the 
opportunity to find gaps and avoid surfaces. In essence we are attacking both gaps and surfaces, 
losing the potential disruption effect that would follow an attack on the center of gravity and 
opting instead for mass destruction of the entire unit.”  ^’ ^
3.4 Conclusion
At this stage it is possible to identify three different schools of thought regarding operational art. 
One group pursues an increased systemic mechanisation with the aim of a more effective “killing 
behaviour”. Its focus is primarily tactical. Naveh and Simpkin, who represent a second group, 
relate to the time-distance relationship differently from that of Boyd’s dogfight or Leonhard’s 
tank battalion. The second group has views that wish to use the right degree of control on the 
right mix of forces. This requires an understanding of the internal interaction in one’s own 
system and how it interacts with an opposing system in a time-space relationship. That does not 
necessarily include the mass destruction of entire units. What Simpkin and Naveh propose is to 
create a systemic shock, which is the deliberate creation of vulnerabilities. But this group has a 
Jominian approach. They are more concerned with the militaiy aspects of achieving military 
strategic aims, without recognising the link between the grand strategic goals and militaiy 
conduct. A third group sees the systemie implications of strategy and relates the art to the use of
Simpkin, Race to the Swift, 148
' Naveh, In Pursuit, 271 
1 1 1 Leonhard, The Art o f Maneuver, 176 
Hamilton, Mark R., Maneuver War fare-And All That, Militaiy Review (January, 1987), 10. The OODA-loop is 
also called the ’’Decision-cycle. This is different from a military units order cycle. The order cycle is how long it 
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all the state’s assets to achieve the giand strategic aim. The interface between the military and 
civilian command level is somewhat obscured, but it seems that this concerns the relationship 
between the military strategic level and other state agencies. That is, according to the Norwegian 
Joint Operational Doctrine (FFOD), manoeuvre theory as opposed to just manoeuvre warfare. 
FFOD claims that manoeuvre warfare in the past was a part of the theories of war. Currently it is 
a part of manoeuvre theory. A state can manoeuvre with all its assets in order to achieve its 
objectives."^ However, that is not what Simpkin meant with manoeuvre theory.
The debate is splitting hairs. Nevertheless, it shows a fundamental difference in perspective and 
opinion on what is supposed to be one theory. The debate is not new either as Beaumont notes: 
“[S]ome German officers were [...] concerned about the dysphasia that had appeared when 
microbattles fought by lower level commanders under the principle of [S\elbstandigkeit [...] 
warped operations out of alignment with the intent of higher commanders [...]. Some of those 
Prussian militaiy theorists anticipated the dilemma that unhinged von Sehlieffen’s grand 
maneuver scheme in 1914 as they grappled with the tension between “ground tmth” and “the big 
picture”. They formulated a “Law of the Situation”, but did not resolve the basic quandary, nor 
could they foresee either the scale or the ramifications of the impending extension of combat in 
time, space and velocity on land, at sea, and in the air.”""* Leonhard is perhaps close to the 
essence of the matter when he states: ’’You can employ mission tactics and yet not fight 
maneuver warfare. Conversely, you can fight according to maneuver warfare principles and yet 
not use mission tactics. Mission tactics simply describes a way in which we converse and make 
decisions on the battlefield; it does not imply a method for fighting.”"^
It appears however, that the elaboration of operational art, especially the theoretical views 
presented by Naveh, gives meaning to the rather misused terminology surrounding command and 
control, or perhaps one should use C’’^*’F*xyz."^ The military principle of, for example, 
centralised command and decentralised execution, adopted by many air forces, is superfluous 
because it just describes how any system works. Both the Commander of the Air Force and any 
squadron leader are commanders. The issue is on what level different arms and types of units 
should organically belong. Is the artillery a coips or a division level asset? The most practical 
way of organising cannot be decided unless one can determine what type of war is to be fought
FFOD, 49
Beaumont, Roger, War, Chaos, and History, (London, 1994), 9 
Leonhard, Richard, Fighting by the Minutes, (Novato, 1994), 112 
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and who the enemy is."^ Nevertheless, it is the command levels raison d ’etre to preserve 
regulability and to keep the system as a whole intact in its positive progress towards a new state. 
The system’s parts pursue effieiency in achieving the objectives that are needed for a change of 
state for the whole system. Operational art is about balancing the creative tension between the 
command and execution levels on a sliding scale of centralisation.
The next issue is which target should be hit. According to the British doctrine, ”[i]dentiflcation 
of the point against which to concentrate effort so that it will have the greatest effect upon an 
enemy’s force, whilst sustaining minimum loss, is a major component of operational art. [...] 
This is Imown as the Centre of Gravity.”*
4 Centre of Gravity
The key to unlocking the logic of manoeuvre theory may be found in the term centre of gi'avity. 
Clausewitz defined the term as: “Out of these characteristics a certain centre of gravity develops, 
the hub of all power and movement, on which eveiything depends. That is the point against 
which all our energies should be directed.”**® This definition is now found in every manoeuvre 
warfare doctrine. According to one doctrine, the definition has not changed substantially since 
Clausewitz introduced it.*^ ®
How does one relate to a centre of gravity, and how is it related to theories and teims used in 
manoeuvre warfare? Are there several centres of gravity? May a centre of gravity change? Are 
there centres of gravity on each level of war? Is it strong or is it weak? Is it possible to locate it?
According to Greer, “[t]he U.S. Marine Corps is examining an innovative doctrinal approach that 
seek to translate the theoretical constmct of the center of gravity into a practical approach to 
applying combat power. This approach is to find the critical vulnerabilities of an opposing force 
- those that will cause its center of gravity to fail - then attack and defeat critical 
vulnerabilities.”*^* Is there a theoretical construct that no one has been able to put into practice 
since the early 19*'^  century? We will use the Clausewitzian definition to investigate the doctrines 
and literature in order to find some answers to what it is and how one should relate to it.
For other ideas, see for example Warfighting, 89, which uses “decentralized command and control”, or FM 100- 
5, 2-6, “Decentralized decision authority”.
BMD, 46. See also FM 100-5, 6-7 and JP-1, V-3. “A central consideration in applying the operational art is the 
location and nature o f adversaiy centers o f gravity [ .. .] .”
Clausewitz, On War, 595-596 
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4.1 The “Bull’s Eye”
Leonliard notes that ”[a]lthough the term center of gi’avity has become popular in the U.S. Army, 
I have rarely found a field manual that tells me what one looks like, so that I could aim my rifle
at it.” John Warden, a former colonel in the U.S. Air Force may provide Leonhard with a 
bull’s eye.
EADERSHIP
ORGANIC ESSEN TIA LS
INFRASTRUCTURE
ÜPULATIÜH
 FIELDED FORCES
Figure 3: Warden’s five-ring model
Before the air campaign in the 1991 Gulf War, Warden presented a conceptual tool for choosing 
targets. He presented the enemy as a system by using rings. There were five elements; organic 
essentials; infrastmcture; population; field forces; and leadership. The last is the bulls-eye.*^^
According to Warden, each of the elements is a centre of gravity. By analysing the stmcture 
within each ring one can differentiate sub-stmctures and a new layer of centres of gravity occurs. 
By further differentiation one finds specific targets that it is important to eliminate. Earlier, due 
to less precise weapons, it was necessary to attack enemy targets in sequence. For example the 
allied bomber force changed the target systems to be hit before the invasion of Normandy in 
1944. It shifted from bombing industry in Germany to bombing targets that would facilitate the 
allied ground forces’ operations in northern France. Forces had to be concentrated on one set or 
one type of targets in order to achieve a breakthrough or a desired effect. The problem with serial 
bombing was that the enemy could learn from experience. The serial bombing was in this respect 
a rather mono-stable strategy. Thus the Germans moved their factories to less exposed locations
Leonhard, The Art o f  Maneuver, 20
Warden, John A., The Enemy as a System, Air Power Journal, (spring 1995), 45
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after a period of bombing. During the Gulf War in 1991, one assumed that, by carefully picking 
out targets within each of the five rings and attacking them simultaneously, one could paralyse 
the enemy in a more efficient way. One could hit the enemy targets in a combination and within 
a timeframe that made the coherence between the elements disappear. Thus, the allies achieved a 
synergistic effect, as the result of the bombing became greater than the sum of each bomb put 
together. The system as a whole was put in a state of shock through “parallel attack”.*^"* Warden 
expresses a systemic approach similar to the idea of syncopation. The challenge is that the 
number of centres of gravity is equal to the number of identified targets.
4.1.1 The plurality of the centre of gravity
According to the United States Navy there can only be one centre of gravity.* This contrasts 
with FM 100-5, which says that a centre of gravity exists at the strategic, operational and tactical 
levels. In other words, there are several of them .*W hat did the “inventor” of the terra, 
Clausewitz, mean?
According to the author of On War, there could be a number of centres of gravity. He wrote for 
example that: “Still no matter what the central feature of the enemy’s power may be - the point 
on which your efforts must converge -  the defeat and destmction of his fighting force remains 
the best way to begin.”*^  ^He then ranks what he considers to be the most important centres of 
gravity. They were the enemy army, his capital, and the enemy’s principal ally.
He also emphasised that “[t]he first principle is that the ultimate substance of enemy strength 
must be traced back to the fewest possible sources and ideally one.”*^® Clausewitz stated that 
when it was not realistic to reduce it to one, there was “no alternative but to act as if there were 
two wars or even more, each with its own object [i.e. centre of gravity].”*^®
Except for the U.S. Navy’s categorical claim that there is only one centre of gravity, quite the 
opposite is the case for the other doctrines.*^® The difference between the doctrines becomes still 
more obscure when the term is related to the levels of war,
Ibid., 54
U.S. Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare, (1994), chapter 3 
100-5,6-7 
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4.1.2 Centres of Gravity and levels of war
The British Military Doctrine states that the centre of gravity is not used at the tactical level of 
war.*^* As seen above, this is opposed to what is stated in FM 100-5. The U.S. Army’s view is 
also supported by NATO’s AJP-Ol(B), but AJP-3 states that ”it is probably less appropriate tool 
for use at the tactical level.”*^'^  The other doctrines do not touch upon levels. But as they use the 
term in the plural, one may assume that it could be used at several levels of war.
The fact that Clausewitz prefened to reduce the number of centres to one indicates that it should 
be found at the strategic level. This notion is reinforced as Clausewitz related the centre of 
gravity to nations and alliances. However, when Clausewitz looked upon the destruction of the 
enemy army as the primary target, the centre of giavity was on what we today would call the 
operational level. “Combat is the only effective force in war; its aim is to destroy the enemy’s 
force as a means to a further end.”*^  ^As Handel points out, the author of On War did not write a 
book on diplomacy. “Therefore the other means by which conflicts can be won are not within the 
scope of his discussion.”*^"*
But manoeuvre warfare also finds inspiration from Sun Tzu. Although he did not use the 
Newtonian concept, his writings give a clue as to what he thought was the most important 
element to attack. For the Chinese philosopher it was of supreme importance to attack the 
enemy’s strategy.'®^ Attacking the enemy army was of secondary importance. Sun Tzu identified 
centres of gravity primarily on the highest political and str ategic levels. However, both 
Clausewitz and Sun Tzu elaimed that, if the eentre of gravity was correctly identified, victory 
could be achieved more efficiently at a lower cost. As they contradiet each other with regard to 
what was the most important to eliminate, this might have caused some confusion among the 
manoeuvrists. As Sun Tzu obviously wanted to avoid attacking the enemy mass, he seems to be 
more in line with modem manoeuvre warfare than Clausewitz is.
The investigation into doctrines shows fundamental differences on the plurality of the term and 
the level at which the concept is applicable. In 1999, General Short believed it to be the president 
of Serbia, whereas SACEUR believed it to be the Serbian 3^  ^Army in Kosovo.*®® A further 
investigation into the concept and how one relates to it may give some more concrete answers.
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4.2 Attacking the centre of gravity
In one NATO publication the centre of gravity is defined as the hub of all power and movement 
on which everything depends, or the point against which all energies should be directed. In the 
original definition, the centre of gravity is the point against which all our energies should be 
directed.’®^ Most of the doctrines have excluded this sentence.*®  ^ This could indicate that the 
prevailing thought is that one could direct all energies against something other than a centre of 
gravity.*®®
Richard Leonhard supports the U.S. Marine Corps’ 1989 doctrinal view and says there is a 
danger in using the term. He then refers to Clausewitz: “A center of gravity is always found 
where the mass is concentrated the most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow; 
furthermore, the heaviest blow is that stmck by the center of gravity.”*"*® “Clearly, Clausewitz 
was advocating a climactic test of strength against strength [...] This approach is consistent with 
Clausewitz’s historical perspective. But we have since come to prefer pitting strength against 
weakness. Applying the term to modern warfare, we must make it clear that by the enemy’s 
center of gravity we do not mean a source of strength, but rather a critical vulnerability.”*"**
The U.S. Marine Corps developed its cognition of the centre of gravity in its 1997 edition of 
Warfighting. It is now not a critical vulnerability, but critieal vulnerabilities within the centre of 
giavity. It is the critical vulnerabilities of the enemy that should be hit. But the doctrine also opts 
for hitting smaller centres of gravity at the same time. According to Warfighting, centres of 
gravity and critical vulnerabilities are complementary and success in war depends on the ability 
to direct our efforts against them. *"*^
According to the Norwegian Doctrine for Land Operations (NDLO) it is possible to influence a 
centre of gravity indirectly through one or several decisive points. The decisive points in turn can 
be attacked indirectly through one or more critical vulnerabilities.*"*® This means that the critical 
vulnerabilities are to be found, not in the centre of gravity as in the USMC doctrine, but in 
relation to the decisive points. The USMC does not use the term decisive point, but rather uses 
the tenus critical vulnerabilities or smaller centres of gravity.
Clausewitz, On War, 596
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In FFOD decisive points are named vital points. They are part of one or several centres of 
gravity and are abstract, physical or variable.*"*"* The doctrine explains that Jomini introduced 
vital points and that he differed between vital points of manoeuvre and vital geographic points. 
However, that is not actually what Jomini wrote. He introduced two classes of points. One class 
was “objective points”. The other class was “decisive strategic points”. Of the first class there 
were objective points of manoeuvre and geographical objective points. “In strategy, the object of 
the campaign deteimines the objective point. If this aim be offensive the point will be the 
possession of the hostile capital or that of a province whose loss would compel the enemy to 
make peace.” *"*® Next, he thought that ”the name of decisive strategic point should be given to 
all those which are capable of exercising a marked influence either upon the result of the 
campaign or upon a single enterprise.”*"*® In this class of points there were “accidental points of 
maneuver” and “decisive geographic points.” Also in this class of points the possession of the 
enemy capital was important. Both of Jomini’s classes of points are then similar to Clausewitz’s 
second most important centre of gravity. Is a eentre of gravity then a decisive point?
According to FM 100-5 ”[d]ecisive points provide commanders with a marked advantage over 
the enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an action [...]. Decisive points are not centres of 
gravity; they are the keys to getting at centres of gravity.”*"*^ However, FM 100-5 prescribes that, 
during planning, all potential decisive points must be analysed in order to find out which of them 
makes it possible to attack the enemy centre of gravity. Those potential decisive points are 
allocated resources. They are then designated as objectives.*"*  ^One may assume that an objective 
is similar to what the British Doctrine calls a point of weakness. Accordingly, ”[...] manoeuvre 
depends for success on the application of force against identified points of weakness -  
concentration of force at a decisive point.” *"*®
While FM 100-5 seems to regard decisive points or objectives as entirely physical, the Nato 
doctrines have a broader view. According to AJP-3 a decisive point is a point that may exist in 
time, space or in the information sphere. It is the co-ordinated activity and its effect on the 
enemy, regardless of battle, physical encounter and geographical dependence, that determines 
whether it is a decisive point or not. *®® The term deeisive point is also used in AJP-Ol(B). But 
here also the term ’’critical decisive point” is introduced. This is related to a more direct approach
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to the centre of gravity. ’The direct approach involves a linear, uninterrupted approach against an 
opposing force’s [centre of gravity] often by the way of critical decisive points.”*®*
At this stage it is necessary to give a short résumé of the findings. At least Jomini’s objective 
points seem to have similarities with Clausewitz’s centre of gravity. One proponent of 
manoeuvre warfare is of the opinion that the centre of gravity is a critical vulnerability. Another
tells us that it is either a weakness or strength. According to the doctrines one or more centres of
gravity on all levels of war may be attacked directly, but preferably indirectly, through abstract, 
variable or physical:
(1) critical vulnerabilities within the centres of gravity,
(2) smaller centres of gravity within a larger centre of gravity
(3) critical vulnerabilities in decisive points,
(4) vital points which are part of a centre of gravity
(5) objectives which are the most important decisive points,
(6) points of weakness which are the same as decisive points,
(7) critical decisive points.
In 1988, Colonel Warden determined that Soviet depot fuel manifolds were centres of gravity. *®® 
In both the last wars against Iraq, Saddam Hussein was seen as the “hub of all power and 
movement”. When the manoeuvrists introduce the original German term, Schwerpunkt, they can 
perhaps square the circle.
4.2.1 When the Schwerpunkt attacks the centre of gravity
William Lind was one of the civilian reformers in the American defence establishment during 
the period of doctrinal change within the U.S. Army. According to Naveh, Lind provided the 
uniformed reformers with the keys to develop an advanced conceptual substitution for the 
traditional paradigm of tactical attrition. Moreover, by introducing new operational ideas and 
terminology, “[he] provided the military reform circle [...] with conceptual and linguistic 
patterns that could serve as a basis for a new professional cognition.”*®®
AJP-3, 3-7 
AJP-Ol(B), 3-4
Olsen, John, A., Operation Desert Storm, (London, 2000), 100 
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One of the terms Lind introduced was the term ''SchwerpunkF. However, “SchwerpunkF was 
not translated into “centre of gi-avity”, but “focus of effort”. Lind reminds us that it is dangerous 
to translate it as “point of main effort”, while it is not a point on the map. “Schwerpunkt is not 
just the main attack [...]. It is a conceptual focus, not just a physical one. All commanders refer 
to the Schwerpunkt, along with their superior’s intent and the mission, in making their own 
decisions. Each makes sure his action supports the Schwerpunkt.”*®"*
Schwerpunkt then becomes a dynamic and harmonising direction of force represented through 
the unit designated with the main mission. Schwerpunkt obtains mass through the support 
contributed by other units. Lind develops the term by introducing surfaces and gaps. Surfaces 
represent the enemy strength, and gaps are less strong parts of, for example, a front line. Through 
the method of reconnaissance pull, where the reconnaissance units are leading the direction, this 
unit pulls the Schwerpunkt through the gaps. This is essential in the theory where one is 
supposed to avoid the enemy strength. Lind continues his definition. When a gap is found or 
created this will be the breakthrough point where the force is pulled through. Part of the force is 
used to suppress the enemy by massive firepower and widen the gap. The rest of the force 
progresses into the rear area of the enemy sector and makes him eollapse. The decisive point 
then seems to be the gap, or what creates a gap - penetration.
The inspiration from Lind is clearly seen in some of the doctrines. According to USMC’s 
Warfighting, there will always be one activity that is more important than any other during an 
operation. This activity is dedicated to a specific unit as a mission. According to the doctrine the 
dedieated unit then represents the main effort. All other units within the command will support 
the main effort.*®® The U.S. Army has cognition of the dynamism as it opts for a change of main 
effort to another supportive attack if this reveals itself as more beneficial. In the U.S. Army, 
”[c]ommanders designate a point of main effort and focus resources to support it.” *®® It is then 
slightly less important than a decisive point, which includes massing the “effeets of 
ovei-whelming combat power at the decisive place and time.”*®^ Does this mean that a main 
effort could be directed at less important “points”?
Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, 18-19. See also Citino, Robert M., The Path to Blitzkrieg, (Colorado, 1999), 
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The Norwegian army concentrates forces in a manner that achieves the desired end-state. The 
desired end-state is achieved through successful operations on deeisive points. However, the 
focus of effort could be on either shaping or decisive operations. The decisive operations are 
what bring a desired end state, while the shaping operations will only ereate windows of 
opportunity. The doctrine explains that the end-state of a shaping operation is the departure point 
for the decisive operation.*®®
In the NATO doctrines, only AJP-3 defines the term main effort. It is the concentration of forces 
or means in a particular area, where a commander seeks to bring about a decision. “[It] provides 
a focus for the activity that the commander considers crucial to success.” *®® FFOD takes another 
view. “The manoeuvre elements must be deployed in a manner that ensures a co-ordinated 
concentration of force in time and space against chosen centres o f gravity or vital points.” *®*
We can provide Leonhard with many targets he can aim his rifle at. But he may also, as one of 
the critics of manoeuvre warfare put it, be “hitting ’em where they ain’t.”*®® Maybe a passage 
from Lind’s manoeuvre warfare handbook sums up how Newton’s theory is applied. “[...] the 
secret of the Panzers’ success: they [i. e. the Schwerpunkt'] struck directly at an enemy’s strategic 
centre o f gravity, such as the juncture of the French armies in Belgium with those in France 
itself.”*®® This could give the Bundeswehr some linguistic challenges when relating to doctrines 
written in English.*®"* Is the modem cognition the centre of gravity at odds with the 
Schwerpunkt!
4,3 Centre of Gravity of Centre of Confusion
One source of the confusion could be found in the definition common for most of the doctrines. 
’'The Centre o f Gravity is that characteristic, capability, or locality from which a military force,
nation or alliance derives its freedom o f action, physical strength or will to fight. ,165
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This is an alteration of the Clausewitzian definition. Whereas he induced characteristics into a 
“Schwerpimkf\ the modem doctrines deduce it. What the translation of Vom Kriege said was: 
“[o]ne must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out o f these 
characteristics a certain center o f gravity develops, [...]”.*®® As will be seen below, this sentence 
includes something with wider consequences. However, Dr Strange of the Marine Corps 
University has worked on the definition:
center o f gravity are [...] the moral, political and physical entities which possess certain 
characteristics and capabilities, or benefit from a given location/terrain.”^^ ^
Strange proposes the following to clarify what a centre of gravity is:
“Centers of Gravity: Primary sources of moral or physical strength, power and resistance.
Critical Capabilities: Primary abilities which merit a Center of Gravity to be identified as such 
in the context of a given scenario, situation or mission.
Critical requirements: Essential conditions, resources and means for a critical capability to be 
frilly operative.
Critical vulnerabilities: Critical requirements or components thereof which are deficient, or 
vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction or attack (moral/physical harm) in a manner achieving 
decisive results.”*®^
From the above clarification one sees that
( 1 ) decisive points (if this is the common word to use) occur when one through
(2) critical vulnerabilities influences the
(3) critical requirements in such a way that one prevents the
(4) critical capabilities fr om being fully operative.
By this mode of operation one influences the centre of gravity indirectly. Clausewitz wrote that 
“[i]n war as in the world of inanimate matter the effect produced on a center of gravity, is 
determined and limited by the cohesion of the parts.”*®® This implies that Clausewitz had a
Clausewitz, On War, 595. See also Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, Dritter Band, 122-123. “Es korat darauf an die 
vorherrschendend Verhaltnisse beider Staaten im huge zu haben, Aus ihnen wird sich ein gewisser Schwerpunkt.” 
Strange, Joe, Centers o f  Gravity c& Critical vulnerabilities, (Virginia, 1996), 48 
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systemic approach upon the centre of giavity. It consisted of interdependent parts, and was not 
fuel manifolds or dictators per se.
4.4 Conclusion
A system’s hierarchical structure and columnar mode of actions are an essential condition and a 
critical requirement in order to harmonise an organisation towards its aim. Theoretically, by 
dividing the directing part from the body that executes the physical actions (mass), one separates 
a centre of gravity from its primary ability. The critical capability of steering itself towards the 
aim is impeded. In order to achieve this in a coherent hierarchical enemy system, the division 
should be directed as deep into the system as possible. As an illustration, one can picture the 
bottom of the triangular hierarchy as made up of the primary mass. In order to reach into the 
softer parts of the triangle (where the directing bodies and support elements are) one has to 
penetrate, or bypass the mass constituting the lower echelons [i.e. operate on interior and exterior 
lines]. The aim is to reduce the opposing system’s synergy. One separates units and formations, 
and impedes the co-operation between them both horizontally and laterally. The elements of the 
enemy system will find themselves fighting for the immediate objective.*The enemy is then in 
a state of systemic shock. In other words, the enemy will fight umelated tactical battles in a 
linear and rather mono-stable mindset.
A systemic shock should be created deliberately, and implies a proper balance between offence 
and a defensive posture. This requires synchronisation, which seeks to produce effects within an 
enemy system, corresponding to the attributes of an array of forces, both simultaneously and 
sequentially. Disintegration and erosion is achieved through the simultaneous pressure within the 
enemy’s response time at the level affected. This is exactly how Warden illustrates what he calls 
parallel attacks on selected targets within the 5-ring model. Although Warden’s model is simple, 
it is holistic in its approach. It illustrates the importance of joint operations, where the elements 
represented by different arms, express different mass, velocities and range. As it also contains 
elements and interactions that are not confined to the militaiy sphere, he illustrates the 
importance of using other instruments of state power. The challenge with Warden’s model is of 
course the inflation of centres of gravity. This could be overcome by combining the model with 
the terminology proposed by Strange.
The notion of deep parallel attacks is reflected in some of the doctrines, most notably in FM 100- 
5. However, in other doctrines, the purpose attacks are just deep penetration, and this seems to
170 Naveh, In Pursuit, 17. Naveh proposes a similar view, although he rejects the use o f the term centre o f gravity.
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have become an end in itself. That has led to doctrines that give considerable attention to the 
offensive and pre-emptive attacks, at the expense of a balance between offence and defence. 
With inspiration from what appears to be the Maneuver Warfare Handbook's bottom-up 
approach, it implies that fighting will be conducted in the same manner as an enemy in systemic 
shock. This may work against an enemy stuck with a Maginot-line approach. However, 
manoeuvre warfare was originally founded on the anticipation of major or total war with a 
numerically superior enemy attacking with several echelons. The manoeuvrists appear not to 
have distilled how the Wehrmacht applied its form of manoeuvre warfare against the Russians in 
the latter part of WW II.
Does equipping ourselves with what Schanrhorst saw as ambiguous terms, principles and 
concepts that do not clarify the links between the whole war and its parts enhance the probability 
of winning wars? The problem with Clausewitz’s work is all the contradictions. Clausewitz 
himself was dissatisfied with it and claimed that he intended to rewrite it entirely. It does not 
enhance clarity by mixing a term that perhaps was not even clear to Clausewitz, with Jomini’s 
terminology and Sun Tzu’s thoughts. Much of Clausewitz’s and Jomini’s logic rested on the 
assumption that the enemy army was the most important to destroy, which contradicts Sun Tzu. 
According to FM 100-5, “[t]he ultimate military purpose of war is the destruction of the enemy’s 
armed forces and will to fight.”**'® This is something not every manoeuvrist would agree to.
The centre of gravity could be a battle, an army, a capital, a nation or an alliance. The term is 
used for all levels of war and in singular and plural. It has produced some second thoughts on the 
laws of physics. It has led militaiy commanders to believe it could be everything from fuel 
manifolds to dictators. One might conclude that the application of the term, at least when used in 
a joint and combined setting, confuses rather than clarifies. Perhaps most important, the 
interpretation of Clausewitz by those who spoke his mother tongue developed their own 
cognition of the centre of gravity in their approach to war. As this approach is the inspiration for 
the manoeuvrists, the next chapter will start out with the centre of gravity and see how the 
Germans seem to have interpreted the concept.
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5 The German approach
The confusion surrounding the tenn makes it appropriate to return to the question as to why the 
centre of gravity is important. Why do we want to protect our own, and why do we want to 
attack the enemy’s centre of gravity? “Which, if eliminated will bend him most quickly to our 
will?”*^®
5.1 Schwerpunkt
It is the enemy centre of gravity that threatens the achievement of our own aim. It is our own 
centre of gravity that prevents the enemy from achieving his aim. Clausewitz wrote that the 
defence is the stronger form of war, but with a negative object, [i.e. preventing the enemy 
achieving his aim] The offensive is the weaker form of war, but with a positive purpose, [i.e. the 
attainment of one’s own aim]*^ "* But according to Clausewitz there is no true polarity between 
attack and defence. The tme polarity lies in ’’the object both seek to achieve: the decision.
What Clausewitz seems to have meant with his induction was that it was the merging of 
dominant characteristics from both belligerents that constitutes the Centre of Gravity. “[S]ince 
the essence of war is fighting, and since that battle is the fight of the main force, the battle must 
always be considered as the true center of gravity of the war.”’®® This implies that the object, the 
decision, is the battle. He confirms these thoughts in his statement; ”[...] to impose our will on 
the enemy is its [i.e., war’s] object. To secure that object we must render the enemy powerless; 
and that, in theory, is the true aim of warfare. That aim takes the place of the object, discarding it 
as something not actually part of war itself.”’®® According to Naveh, Clausewitz was subjecting 
the essence of warfare to the mechanical logic of the duel. He assumed that the operational 
manoeuvre was nothing other than a collision between two strategic masses -  one defending and 
the other attacking. The positive object of destruction then guides the attack. Accordingly, the 
attacker should always assemble the greater part of his mass against the defender’s concentrated 
mass.’®^
But in another passage Clausewitz writes: “The preservation of one’s fighting forces and the 
destmction of the enemy’s -  in a word - victory is the substance of this struggle; but it can never 
be its ultimate object. The ultimate object is the preservation of one’s own state, and the defeat of 
the enemy’s; again in brief, the intended peace treaty, which will resolve the conflict and result
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in a common settlement.”’®® By this he seems to mean that military victory is not the ultimate 
end. It is only the means to a peace in which opposed wills unite.
Aron has presented an explanation for these contradictions. He argues that Clausewitz moved 
away from a definition that saw war as a clash of wills because of Clausewitz’s problem with the 
dialectic between the armed forces and territory, hence Mearsheimer’s and Delbriick’s 
definitions of two types of war.’ ®^ One needed to make the enemy powerless to overcome his 
will. Each of the belligerent states was seen as divided into an armed force and a territory. The 
armed forces were dependent upon the territory’s ability to maintain, support and regenerate the 
armed forces. But possession of some or sometimes the whole enemy territory did not always 
assure the destmction of the enemy armed forces. In contrast, the destmction of the armed forces 
would assure possession or conquest. The enemy was then powerless. By moving away from the 
abstract and moral factor of “conflicting wills”, this problem could be resolved. “[T]he wills aim 
at the overthrow of the enemy state. Since each state consists of territory and an army, both are 
objects of attack and defence. Each wants to preserve itself and destroy what the other possesses. 
As territory is controlled by the army but not the reverse, at least in the short term, the primary 
target of whichever side wants to conquer the other is the armed forces of the enemy.”’ Thus a 
Niederwerfimgsstrategie with the annihilation of the enemy army was preferred.
Clausewitz brought his logic forward when applying Newton’s physics to war. Clausewitz 
concluded that each belligerent had a certain unity and therefore some cohesion. “Where there is 
cohesion, the analogy of the center of gravity can be applied.”’ ®^ According to Clausewitz the 
fighting forces possess certain centres of gravity where they are most densely concentrated. By 
that he concluded that the movement and direction of these centres of gravity would govern the 
rest of the more dispersed forces.
The problem in wars and campaigns was that battles were numerous and separated. The defender 
tended to disperse his forces in order to guard the territory. By doing that the “connection” 
between the different units was weakened. It would also be harder to determine what was the 
correct centre of gravity [i.e. the densest mass]. In contrast, the attacker sought to keep his forces
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concentrated. This would facilitate a strong connection between the units and consequently a 
stronger centre of gravity. Because of the dispersed enemy, and the problem of determining 
which of his units constituted the strongest centre of gravity, the attacker risked using his 
strongest forces in vain. It was a “waste of energy which in turn [meant] a lack of strength 
elsewhere.”’ ®^ In other words, beating a defending unit would not produce the necessary side 
effects, because the connection between a chosen target and the rest of the defending army was 
too weak. Clausewitz suggested that “[t]he general action may therefore be regarded as war 
concentrated, as the centre of gravity of the whole war or campaign.’ ®^ By this he presents a 
holistic view, where the mechanics of each tactical battle in itself represents smaller centres of 
gravity. The effects or result of each battle makes up the centre of gravity as an entity at the 
highest level. But because of the dialectic between dispersion and concentration in attack and 
defence, Clausewitz recognised that there was a limit. Thus, he defined this limit as a theatre of 
operations. This extended as far as the direct effects of a victory or of a decision over the 
principal forces of the enemy. What was his ideal was that a theatre of war represented a sort 
of unity where a single centre of gravity could be identified. As both belligerents had the same 
aim, the overthrow of the opponent’s aimy, both would concentrate their forces. This was the 
point where the decision should be reached -  an implosion of two opposing centres of gravity in 
an Entscheidungsschlacht.
Naveh argues coiTectly when he states that this is to subject war to a mechanistic duel. However, 
Clausewitz wrote both about “absolute war” which was the Platonic ideal war, and war as it was 
in re a lity .W h e n  he for example used the “duel” as a metaphor in Book 1, Chapter 1, section 2, 
he modified this in section 11 with the political considerations of the war.*^ ® “The political object 
-  the original motive for the war -  will thus determine both the military objectives to be reached 
and the amount of effort it requires.”’®® In Clausewitz’s work one can read that the political 
object of the war hitherto “had been overshadowed by the law o f the extremes, the will to 
overcome the enemy and make him powerless. But as this law begins to lose its force and as this
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determination wanes, the political aim will reassert itself.” One could by this statement 
believe that the law of the extremes was allowed to play an independent part during conflict. 
However, Clausewitz emphasised that it would be apt to assume that war should replace politics 
and be “ruled by no law but its own.”’®®Aron’s explanation must therefore be seen as an example 
of the ideal war. As we shall see below, it seems that the Germans interpreted Clausewitz’s book 
in a way that allowed for the law of extremes to play its part during a conflict.
5.2 Moltke
During the Franco-Prussian war in 1871, an argument between Bismarck and Moltke took place. 
Militarily the Geiman aimy had all but won the war, and Napoleon III was a captive. But the 
Parisians, headed by Gambetta, were deteimined to fight on. Bismarck, the German Chancellor, 
wanted to bombard Paris in order to teiminate the war quickly. Moltke disagreed. The military 
resources could be used better elsewhere, and the Parisians could be starved into surrender. 
Bombardment would only stiffen the resistance among the population. Bismarck turned to the 
Kaiser and got his support. However, this was a rare exception. During the Franco-Prussian war, 
Bismarck was in fact more or less kept away fi'om the possibility of influencing the operations of 
the Geiman military.’®®
In his thesis of 1871, ”Über Stratégie”, Moltke defined the terms strategy, operations and tactics. 
First, the role of strategy was to achieve the aims formulated at the political level. Second, 
strategy involved the preparation of the military means and the initiation of military action.
Third, strategy involved the utilisation of the prepared military means through operations.
Moltke’s operative Dânken also included the differentiation of aims. He distinguished clearly 
between the Operationsobjekt and Kriegsobjekt. The Operationsobjekt was the enemy’s armed 
forces, when these protected the Kriegsobjekt. The latter was normally the capital, the resources, 
the territory and the political power of the opponent state.’®"*
The term ”Operationen” was not, by Moltke's definition, an intermediate decision or command 
level between tactics and strategy. ’®® Operativ was the operationalisation of military strategy. In 
militaiy writings in late 19* century Germany, the term ”Operationen” was mostly used in 
relation to the deployment and movement of troops. Operationen was instrumental to the
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convergence of troops at the site o f ûiq Entscheidungsschlacht. It was: “Getrennt marschieren, 
vereint schlagen!”’^  ^However, the amiies grew bigger and the demand for more space to 
manoeuvre also made them more difficult to control. The strategy of the single point lost 
relevance. The commanders sought to stretch Napoleon’s “single point” decisive battle laterally. 
By pinning the enemy frontally, and simultaneously extending to the enemy’s soft flanlc, one 
could achieve envelopment. The diffieulties of eontrol, and the fog and friction of war, led 
Moitke to hold more strongly the conviction that his subordinate commanders had to thinlc and 
act according to the situation. In order to achieve envelopment on a grand scale, the Gennan 
army commanders were given directives as opposed to detailed orders. A superior grasp of the 
situation and eonduct of the action as a whole with the conviction that the whole determined the 
parts “would compensate for any errors made in detail by senior subordinate commanders.
Thus, what we call mission command has historically a relevance to the German notion of the 
operational level. In the lower echelons a rather strict discipline were held.^^^
It seems that the Germans isolated what we by modern standards would call the operational 
level. In Moltke's view, war was an instmment of policy, but politics only played an influential 
part at the beginning of and at the end of a war. Politics should not influence the operations 
This view is not consistent with Clausewitz’s ideas on the primacy of politics. However, it is 
identical to the opening sentences from book 1, chapter 1, section 11, as referred to above. This 
view implied that the German generals did their functions as masters of the “Gesetz des 
Àustersten” independently of the war’s grand strategic objectives. For Moitke, the ultimate 
military purpose was the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces, the Operationsobjekt. Only 
through a Niederwerfungsstrategie with the means of a Vernichtungsschlacht could one dictate a 
peace that was in accordance with the grand strategy. The legacy of Moitke also inspired the 
friture Geiman generals in another important aspect. Moltke’s dilemmas during his last years was
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that the war with France and the development of European societies made it difficult to isolate a 
war with unlimited military objectives as a continuation of policy from total war. "We want to 
believe," he told the Reichstag, "that neither the Thirty Years' nor the Seven Years' War will 
recur, but when millions of individuals are engaged in a bitter struggle for national existence, we 
camiot expect that the matter will be decided with a few victorious battles.”^^  ^The era of Cabinet 
Wars was over. The solution to this was the pre-emptive attack.
5.3 Schlieffen
These lines of thought were brought forward and refined by Moltke’s successor. Clausewitz’s 
theories and Moltke’s praxis were synthesised in Schlieffen’s writings, where his Denkschrift of 
1906 perhaps best illustrates this. The 1906 Denkschrift was later to become known as the 
Schlieffen Plan.
According to Zuber, Geiman planning prior to World War I, including that of Schlieffen, was 
more pragmatic than the Denkschrift indicates. Zuber suggests that the German army in 1914 
actually made plans according to the anticipation that it was the French that would conduct the 
opening moves. The French army, it was believed, would launch a main and a supporting attack 
through LoiTaine and the Ardennes. The German plan was to beat the French attack decisively in 
the first battle. They would then conduct the second phase of the campaign, and go on the 
offensive. The army would wheel behind the French fortress line. Once this campaign was 
successfully accomplished the Germans would launch a second campaign into the interior of 
France.^ ®"^
However, after WW I, Geiman historians interpreted the 1906 Denkschrift as the template for all 
subsequent war plans prior to 1914.^°  ^ Schlieffen envisaged a pre-emptive attack with the aim of 
a gigantic Cannae-like battle of annihilation. That would satisfy the Niederwerfungsstrategie?'^^ 
Due to Germany’s fear of a two front war, a sort of Ermattungsstrategie would have violated 
Clausewitz’s law of the extremes. The interpretation of Clausewitz brought forward the idea that 
it was a waste of energy not to concentrate the force to the utmost.^^^ Thus Schlieffen differed 
from Moitke in one important respect. In Schlieffen’s view, Moitke had violated the principle of 
concentration by the introduction of directive control. Army commanders had occasionally lost 
sight of the central objective. It was a strategy of expedients. It seems that Schlieffen’s
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interpretation of Clausewitz lead to a centralisation of command and detailed pre-planning. 
However, apparently some degree of freedom was maintained. Staff officers were sent out to the 
various field units acting as the “eyes” of the General Staff. These staff officers were what 
Creveld calls, “directed telescopes”. I f  commanders in the field should enjoy some degree of 
freedom, it required a control system that allowed the General Staff to take part in the 
subordinates’ decisions. This twin command system was supposed to balance each other in the 
Gesamtschlacht.
Schlieffen’s grand scheme, the manoeuvre a priori as Rothenberg calls it, expressed his idea of a 
Gesamtschlacht?'^^ ”[It] combined diverse battlefields and partial battles into an ’’integral 
operation” in which military action no longer consisted of maneuvers that narrowed down the 
space of an operation to the actual battlefield and culminated in a final and decisive battle with 
the enemy’s main forces. The new ’’integral operation” knew only one joint and continuous 
movement, whose object was not any specific battlefield or specific concentration of forces at a 
given place, but the unfolding dynamics of militaiy action against a whole nation or even 
nations. Schlieffen thus replaced an arithmetical concept of operations, which added up battles 
into a campaign, with a dynamic one that developed out of deployment and rolled on, self- 
sustaining and gathering velocity in a grand enveloping action [..,] This drastically altered the 
relation between individual battles and the military campaign overall. Now there were no 
individual battles, but only the expanding torrents of a campaign.” Geyer’s description 
illustrates the idea behind Clausewitz’s imagination of the ideal centre of gravity.
However, according to Zuber, “[tjthere never was a “Schlieffen Plan”.^ ^^  The plan envisaged in 
the Denkschrift required more divisions than Geiinany created before the war. Thus when war 
broke out in 1914, the German army did not have enough forces for the wheeling around Paris. 
When the Schlieffen plan apparently had failed, blame was put on Moitke the younger. Moitke 
had not understood Schlieffen’s operational design. He made the right wing that was supposed to 
wheel round the French capital, too weak. Accordingly, the holding force in Lorraine was made 
umiecessarily strong.^B lam e was also put on the decision of what modern manoeuvrists would 
call an independent thinking General Staff officer, acting as a “directed telescope”. For the 
admirers of Schlieffen it was an “’’irresponsible decision” to withdraw behind the Mame at the
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very moment of alleged victory [.. The opening battles did not produce a decision and as 
the battles in the autumn of 1914 petered out, the Germans had reached their culminating point. 
However, this did not necessarily imply that the political aims reasserted themselves.
5.4 LudendorfF
When Ludendorff came to power, he reversed the traditional isolation of operational conduct. Or 
rather, operational conduct became the grand strategic guidance, whose aim of total victory 
shaped all society.^*"  ^Unlimited war stopped being a continuation of policy and became total. His 
technocratic lule, with a quest for efficiency, or rather increased “mechanisation” of the whole 
society, also led to refonns in the aimy. These reforms bear noteworthy similarities to some 
aspects of modern manoeuvre warfare.
The evolution of “elastic defence” led to a dispersal of units. This in turn, to paraphrase 
Clausewitz, meant that the cohesion of the centre of gravity became weaker, at least initially. To 
compensate for this, two inteuelated factors emerged. First, dispersal meant that units had to rely 
on their own ability to survive more than relying on support from higher echelon units. Thus, 
lower level units were given organic weapons that previously had been held at higher echelons. 
They now became all arms units. Second, to compensate for a weaker connection/cohesion, the 
traditional system of hierarchy was replaced with a further decentralisation of the command 
system. But this Auftragstaktik was more linked to the optimisation of the use of weapons. 
According to Creveld, the control of the actual fighting devolved to junior ranks and NCOs as a 
necessity because of the all arms concept.^
The new units required soldiers with certain personality traits. These new “stormtroopers” 
developed a spirit that was at odds with that of line infantry. Treneh warfare had turned the 
ordinary infantryman into a species of laborer.^ The ordinary infantry soldiers were kept going 
by a combination of patriotic propaganda, coercion and solidarity with his fellow soldiers. The 
stomitroopers were encouraged to look upon war as the supreme fulfilment of one’s self, or at 
least it was what Ludendorff wanted.
In relation to Bertalanffy’s theory, the evolution of army organisation led to an increased 
“mechanical” behaviour in the conduct of military action. It offered the “opportunities for self­
designated activity and mission oriented action, even down to the individual soldier.
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Increasing “mechanisation” also meant increasing determination on the part of the units to 
depend only on themselves/'^ But the segregation of the army and society also brought forward 
an increase in centralisation. A gap developed between the tactical and the strategic level. If the 
case had been that the achievement of the Kriegsobjekt would lead to a better peace, the aim 
might have imposed regulability on the German aimy. That would have created a cognitive 
tension between an abstract strategic aim and the objectives lower down the hierarchy. The case 
is that Ludendorff inherited the idea that the real grand strategic aim was the Operationsobjekt.
In one sense then, for Ludendorff, there was in fact no disequilibrium between the objectives of 
the units and the system as a whole. The aim was the destruction of the enemy aimed forces.
This could have worked if the war could be isolated to a pure military confrontation, a cabinet 
war, between the involved nations. But because the war, as Moitke had feared, had became a 
struggle for the nation’s suiwival, it led to such a mobilisation of national resources that the 
belligerents could only be overcome through a combination of military defeat and psychological 
and physical national exhaustion. The factor of “will” had to be put into a larger context than the 
pure military domain. By making the war machine more efficient in terms of a Clausewitzian 
absolute war, and with the aim of Vernichtung, the strategic level became mono-stable. Attrition 
was the only solution.
In Moltke’s view, strategy was a system of ad-hoc expedients.^'^ Schlieffen disapproved and 
centralised control, relying on his belief that the mechanism of the operation would compel the 
enemy to conformity. Ludendorff turned this upside down. “Gaining many little successes means 
the gradual accumulation of a treasure. In the course of time one grows rich without even 
Imowing it.”^^ '' It seems that it was on the basis of this assumption that the last Geiman 
offensives were planned and executed. For Ludendorff tactics now prevailed over strategy. “I do 
not want to hear the word operation. We hack a hole [into the front]. The rest comes on its 
own.”^ '^ Creveld suggests that the Geimans in their orders for attack introduced minimum 
objectives. Any progress beyond the line on which these objectives lay, would be “thanlcfully 
welcomed by the Army and made use o f H o w e v e r ,  Rupprecht, one of the Army Group 
commanders, wrote in his diary at the end of the offensive. “It is obvious that one cannot discern
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a proper purpose in all OHL’s directives. They always mention certain landmarks, which should 
be reached, and one gets the impression that OHL, [...] lives from hand to mouth, without 
acknowledging a fixed purpose.”^^  ^The offensives fanned out without any recognisable 
Schwerpimkt, perhaps as a result of advances on lines of least resistance beyond the minimum 
objectives.
With respect Ludendorffs '"operative Dankerf\ it is noteworthy that one of the modem 
manoeuvrists’ greatest sources of inspiration, Liddell Hart, supports his line of reasoning. In his 
view the statement that tactics “governs” strategy is by “default of a strategic indirect approach 
[...] undoubtedly true.”^^ '^  Samuels takes the view that Ludendorffs neglect of strategy is “in 
fact a thoroughly sound appreciation of military rea lity .A cco rd in g ly , lofty strategic goals 
would be valueless if a break out was not achieved.
In Liddell Hart’s opinion, Ludendorff failed because he pitched strength against strength. Neither 
Ludendorff himself nor all historians agree on this. Liddell Hart’s basic line was, however, that 
Ludendorff would have reached his goal if he had followed the indirect approach. The conduct 
of war should be like an expanding torrent of water, a metaphor that is widely favoured by many 
advocates of manoeuvre w a r f a r e . Th e  last German offensives did actually become an 
expanding ton'ent. But in relation to strategy and operational art, it appears that the metaphor 
may only be useful if charmels and eanals are built, at least imaginary. Otherwise the water will 
be absorbed somewhere on the Russian steppes, as in the case of Napoleon or Hitler, or more 
recently, in the dusty streets of Baghdad. Without a proper operational design to facilitate the
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better peace, the spirit of the stormtrooper, which according to Lind was enshrined in the 
German post-war regulations seems to have been contra-productive/^^
5.5 The interwar-years
When the German aimy was recreated within the limits of the Versailles treaty, it took on the 
task of analysing the experiences of the war in the fields of both military operations and grand 
strategy. The Germans realised that the country could not endure a long war of attrition. As in 
1914, a doctrine of strategic defence that called for tactical offence with the aim of decisively 
winning the first battles re-emerged. The geo-strategic position, with the risk of a two front war 
coupled with the economic outlook, meant that the German army had to conduct rapid sequenced 
campaigns designed to envelop and annihilate the attacking enemi es .Th i s  was also nourished 
by several other factors.
The German interpretation of Schlieffen’s works after the war, blamed the incompetent generals 
who led the army in its opening phase for the perceived failure to accomplish the ultimate 
Cannae-like battle. The image of a Geiman army that was not beaten in the field, but betrayed by 
soft politicians gave birth to the Dolchstoss myth. After all, the German offensives of 1918 had 
revealed promising results in breaking the deadlock on the Western Front.
The head of the Truppenamt, Seeckt, had been involved with the development of the German 
infiltration tactics during the war and many Geiman officers, including Seeckt, gained 
experience from the more fluid Eastern Front.^^  ^Thus the German officers corps was less biased 
by the experiences of the static treneh warfare than for example their French counterparts.
Among the Germans there was a belief that mobility could be restored to the battlefield. Indeed 
motorization was a prerequisite to ensure the small German army to envelop and annihilate 
enemies in a two front war. This was coupled with the idea of treating the small army as a 
professional elite, a Führerheer, as a basis for future expansion.
Through the co-operation with the Russians, the Germans saw the potential of the combination 
of air power and aimour. In the wake of this, different schemes for providing the necessary 
development of tactics and equipment were launched. This involved co-operation with domestic 
and international industry as well as the setting up of different covert organisations and offices. 
The efforts to learn from the operations during the war, and the new weapons the war had
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brought forth were manifested in regulations that culminated with Army Regulation 300, 
Truppenfiihrung, first published in 1933.
5.5.1 The Development of Blitzkrieg
The development within the Geiman aimy towards its so-called Blitzkrieg approach and how 
this was manifested through Truppenfiihrung have been interpreted differently by modem 
authors and historians. In an article from 1989, Raudzens identified seven different definitions of 
the term Blitzkrieg, which is a challenge when relating these to the different perceptions of 
modern manoeuvre warfare.^^'
5.5.1.1 Was there a Blitzkrieg Doctrine?
According to Miksche, who wrote a book on Blitzkrieg in 1941, the basis for the German 
successes in 1940, were surprise, speed, and superiority in material. Moreover he claimed that a 
typical Blitzki'ieg operation should be planned in minute detail with full allowance made for all 
probable alternative developments. This is contraiy to the argument of some manoeuvrists. “The 
planning has to go back beyond the actual arrangement of the operation itself, and must include 
the organization of forces that can co-operate efficiently so that different units work together on 
agreed and prepared schemes, their work being co-ordinated in time and space.” This 
definition of Blitzkrieg has more in common with the writings of Naveh and Simpkin, than for 
example with Lind. Moreover, Miksche claimed that Blitzkrieg could be systemised logically: 
“The aim is Cannae, the method irruption. Next stage in the argument: the aim is irruption, the 
method is concentration on a narrow front. But here comes in also a third stage in the argument, 
which should logically be interposed between concentration and irruption, as the method by 
which the concentrated forces achieve the piercing of the enemy’s defences. The aim is to carry 
the local superiority due to concentration forward: the method is described by the two German 
words Schwerpimkt and Aufrollen. [...]. They have both a strategic and an operative or a tactical 
meaning,
Truppenfiihrung describes three forms of attack, frontal, penetration and envelopment. Frontal 
attacks are means for penetration. The penetration is a means for envelopment. The envelopment 
also required that the enemy’s front be fixed, which implies both a holding force and an 
advancing f o r ce . Th e re  are several passages in Truppenfiihrung that stress envelopment as a 
prefeiTed pattern, but it is not a dogma. The two other forms of attack could as well achieve a
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successful outcome. Guderian wrote that attacks should be conducted on a broad front, where 
tank forces were organised into three or four lines. These lines, perhaps more in accordance with 
echelons as envisaged in Soviet deep operations theory, were given different types of targets to 
destroy. His idea of attacking on a broad front might be in conflict with his ideas on the 
Schwerpunkt, where he recommends concentration of forces on the decisive point.
As we have seen earlier, Lind claims that Blitzlaieg was conceptually complete by 1918. 
Apparently all the Germans had to do was to write it down in a field manual. This field manual, 
Truppenfiihrung, was according to Messenger, merely a pamphlet that showed little advance 
from the tactics of 1918. In contrast, the idea of Blitzkrieg was manifested through Guderian’s 
visions.^^^ According to Citino, the Wehrmacht had a mature doctrine for annoured warfare at 
the outbreak of WW 11.^ ^^  By doctrine he seems to mean not only the manual Truppenfiihrung, 
but also the dominant operational thinking and teaching within the Gennan army.
Corum agrees with Messenger’s statement on tactics. Although Comm sees the continuity of a 
Cannae-tradition, he claims for example that the Reichswehr’s most interesting tactical 
development was that, “[bjattalions and companies [...] pushed forward and continued to push 
forward, regardless of whether there were troops on their right or left, until stopped by the 
e n e m y . T h i s  bears many similarities with the offensives of 1918. However, the field 
exercises Comm refers to might not have been more realistic than those Moitke the younger tried 
to stop a couple of decades earlier.^^^
According to Citino, the students at the Kriegsakademie learned that “[i]t is false, to restrict the 
mobility of the [Panzer] unit to that of the infantiy”.^ "''' Apparently the armoured units should 
push fbiivard in the style Comm describes, and in accordance with the concept of minimum 
objectives as presented by Creveld. The idea of having troops projecting themselves rather 
independently into the rear of the enemy as a “jazz group jamming” is somewhat contrary to 
what is stressed in Truppenfiihrung. Flanks had to be protected, which implies that the tempo of 
the advance has to take this into account. Units should not advance beyond their attack 
objectives unless specifically authorised to do so. Without flank protection there was a risk that
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one would become enveloped oneself. But again the law of the situation did not exclude open 
flanks.
Naveh criticises Messenger for his claim that Truppenfiihrung was a pamphlet, and is of the 
opinion that Truppenfiihrung was a notable and the only operational dissertation to be made 
under the Nazi regime. Van Creveld, comparing Truppenfiihrung with the 1941 version of FM 
100-5 shows quantitatively, by counting the number of insertions of terms like “attack”, 
“defence”, etc., that the American doctrine was much less single-minded than the German one. 
Creveld claims, for example, that the U.S. doctrine with its emphasis on teamwork implies a 
prerequisite for co-ordination and control. He is of the opinion that this has no direct equivalent 
in the German doctrine, and concludes that the German doctrine put less emphasis on planning, 
control and managerial aspects. But, then, he is not counting the insertions of the term “co­
operation” and associated terms in the manual. However, as Truppenfiihrung emphasised the use 
of combined anus, there are several passages dedicated to the importance of synchronisation and 
co-ordination of the different arms. '^'^ That is a lesson the Germans obviously learned during the 
First World War. The emphasis on combined arms, supports Naveh’s impression that it could be 
regarded as an operational dissertation in the Jominian sense. However, much of the manual’s 
content is focused on somewhat lower level tactics, which by modem standards belong in service 
regulations and handbooks.
What the doctrine and the German ideas of Blitzkrieg were not, is what Posen suggests. A 
Blitzkrieg style attack aimed directly at the adversary’s command, control communications, and 
intelligence functions The German doctrine, and Guderian, if he is to be regarded as the
most prominent advocate of Blitzki'ieg, did not emphasise attacks directed at the enemy’s 
command and control elements, nor did they write about overtaxing the opponent’s command 
system. Command posts were just one target among many, both for the army and air force. The
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manual stresses above all the importance of neutralising enemy artillery and infantry. Guderian 
wanted to concentrate his armour where there was to be a decisive battle.
5.5.1.2 Auftragstaktik
The idea of Auftragstaktik and Gennan orders presented by some manoeuvrists is exaggerated, 
at least in relation to the German doctrinal thinking. Citino, for example, makes a point out of 
what he claims was a German contempt for formal (written) orders during the inter-war years.
He claims that the division was the lowest unit that operated with them, and notes that the 
Germans obviously spoke laughingly about both French tactics and their adherence to written 
orders .However ,  Truppenfiihrung states that ”[w]ritten order is the basic means by which the 
senior commander controls his units. [...]. In the case of simple or short orders, the commander 
may transmit the order verbally. Later, however, the text must be committed to writing.”^^  ^
Guderian confined the idea of short orders and speeial signals to that of the Panzer forces. “In 
combat the transmission of orders are conveyed to the [...] aimoured forces in different and 
much shorter fotms than with the infantry divisions.^''^ Uhle-Wettler, a Wehrmacht veteran 
soldier and later a Lieutenant General and historian, notes that “[...] a comparison of Allied and 
German World War II operations orders reveals few differences and certainly none that are large 
enough to explain differences in force efficiency. Consequently, a change in the format for 
phrasing of combat orders [as for example Lind proposes] will not produce a revival or an 
adoption of Auftragstaktik.” '^'^
According to Truppenfiihrung, Auftragstaktik was formulated as follows; ’’The commander must 
allow his subordinates fieedom of action, so long as it does not adversely affect his overall intent 
(Absicht). He may not, however, surrender to his subordinate’s decision for which he alone is 
responsible.^^'' The manual also stated that it is the independent action of subordinate 
commanders with the prerequisite of close co-ordination that will decisively influence the 
success of the advance. This had to be through “careful synchronization of fire and 
m o v e m e n t . E v e n  Guderian, who is regarded by some manoeuvrists as the antithesis to the 
more conservative generals of the traditional arms, looked upon thorough planning and
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synchronisation as paramount, hi his hook Achtung Panzer, he criticised the allied conduct of 
tank battles during the autumn of 1918 for the lack of co-ordination and simultaneity, and for not 
directing their tanks towards a common objective. “There was no real need for haste and disorder 
of this kind
According to Hughes, the commander foimulated the intent, {Absicht). In this the Germans saw 
what other western armed forces would call a mission. "The commander then assigned tasks 
{Auftrage) to subordinate units to carry out his and his superior’s intent. The subordinate 
commander decided upon a specific course of action which became his resolution {Entschluss)P 
One would expect the intention {Absicht) to be in accordance with the objective set for a 
campaign, hi that respect the Gennan approach does not appear to have deviated much from the 
doctrinal thinking of other nations. Recognition of the importance of the principle of a common 
objective has prevailed as imperative among other armed forces during the 20''' century.^^''
5.6 Conclusion
Truppenfiihrung gives the impression that it is a rather pragmatic manual. As opposed to many 
contemporary doctrines, it is more descriptive than prescriptive. It is devoid of any dogmatic 
rules, which would compel commanders to act or behave in a certain pattern. One can find 
passages that support whatever argument one has on how to conduct operations. With regard to 
doctrine, this makes it difficult to bring forward a clear picture of the Germans’ operational 
cognition, other than that it was rather pragmatic and that the Wehrmacht strongly believed in 
the idea of combined amis. Thus, the conclusions presented by different historians and authors 
with regard to the Geiman doctrine do not need to be mutually exelusive. There were 
traditionalists and progiessive forces within Wehrmacht. The comments Rundstedt, the 
Commander of Army Group A gave to Guderian after an armour exercise in the late 1930s 
perhaps illustrates the point: “All nonsense, my dear Guderian, all nonsense.”^^ ^
Hammerstein-Equord noted in Truppenfiihrung: “This manual assumes strength, arms, and 
equipment in an amiy with unlimited resources.”^^  ^Thus one would assume that the lesson from 
the First World War, that the strategy of the entire nation at war had become a kind of 
intellectual and organisational continuum linking the fiont to the supporting rear would be
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reflected in the doctrinal concept of operations when Germany went to war. By 1939 the 
Wehrmacht had, as a result of a broad rearmament, all the arms envisaged in Truppenfiihrung. 
However, the German army was only partly mechanised. Most soldiers went to war as their 
fathers had done in 1914.
6 Fall Gelb
Three days after Germany had launched the attack against Poland, the documents containing the 
British ultimatum were read out to Hitler’s inner circle at the Chancellery. After a quiet moment, 
when Hitler seemed to be unmoved, he turned to his Foreign Minister with an angry look in his 
eyes and asked “What now”?
6.1 German aims, objectives and strategy
There exist a number of theories in several dimensions as to why the Germans attacked in the 
west, why they won and why they were not deterred. Mearsheimer identifies three schools of 
thought regarding why the Germans were not deterred.
The first theory is that the Germans attacked because they enjoyed an overwhelming military 
superiority. “Naturally enough, this high-speed type of warfare demands eertain specialized 
equipment. The Geimans saw to it that such equipment was available: we on the other hand, did 
not, or only in insuffieient quan t i t i e s .Moreover ,  the Geiman economy, as opposed to the 
allies’, was geared for war. The second theory recognises that in quantitative measures the 
opposing forces were about equal. The overwhelming victory was a result of bad luck on the 
allied side. Neither Hitler nor his generals foresaw a deeisive victory. Hitler’s decision to attack 
was therefore not a rational one.
Mearsheimer’s third identified theory focuses on the style of warfare. The argument is that the 
French and British had not learned the proper lessons of the last war. The Germans had and 
developed Blitzlaieg. This form of warfare was pursued because it did not require an economy 
geared for war. Moreover, according to Mearsheimer, it strengthens the argument that Hitler had 
a well-defined plan, or a grand strategy, but with limited objectives. To Mearsheimer’s third 
school one can also add those who claim that Germany was in fact materially inferior to the 
allies. Then the deliberate design of strategy in accordance with operational and tactical level 
doctrines as a force multiplier becomes more emphasised.^'^'' Mearsheimer points out there were
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two phases of the Gennan planning process for the attack. During the first period, which lasted 
from fall 1939 to February 1940, the Germans pursued a limited aim strategy with limited 
objectives. According to Mearsheimer’s definitions the Germans sought to surprise the allies 
before they could mobilise, minimise clashes, and partially defeat them. The limited objective 
was to occupy only part of the enemy territory. However, the element of surprise was lost, and a 
Blitzki’ieg-style or a strategy of attrition was at the time not seen as any option. From February 
1940 a Blitzkrieg-style attack emerged as an option. The Germans saw it as possible to defeat the 
allies decisively. However, it is Mearsheimer’s opinion that the Germans still had limited 
objectives even though there was an expectation of a decisive victory.
6.2 Interpretations of Blitzkrieg 1940
Mearsheimer’s arguments are contested. It is not the scope of this thesis to venture into German 
foreign policy and economic preparation prior to the war. However, Overy for example, claims 
that Hitler had what Mearsheimer would call unlimited objectives, with plans to fight major wars 
of conquest. But these were to be fought considerably later than 1939/1940. The intention was a 
large-scale mobilisation of society. Thus the lack of economic preparation and large-scale 
annament in 1939/1940 was due to the fact that it was out of step with German foreign policy 
and not necessarily because the Wehrmacht prefeired Blitzkrieg-type operations that did not 
need an economy geared for war.^*" Kroener supports Overy’s view when it comes to 
management of manpower. He elaims that the National Socialist regime did not have in mind a 
Blitzki'ieg plan in 1940. This would have required particularly comprehensive advance personnel 
planning in order to maintain a reasonable production level in civilian society.^^^ But this was 
not the case. Given Oveiy’s argument, given the fact that German aimour was about equal in 
quantity, and given that it is reasonable to interpret the doctrine as not one of a Blitzkrieg- 
approach, was Blitzki'ieg, as Geyer noted just an “avalanche of actions that were sorted out less 
by design than by success.”?^ ^^
Corum is of the opinion that the German military leadership excelled at the tactical and 
operational level of war, but ’’they demonstrated a poor grasp of s t r a t eg y .O th e r s  propose that 
Blitzki'ieg lacked operational coherence and was nothing more than an expression of tactical 
excellence.^^^ It was the result of tactically minded technocrats who had never learned to
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evaluate operations within the context of a coherent strategy. These technocrats light-heartedly 
followed the orders of their superiors.^^^
Some historians, for example Naveh, reject Fa// Gelb as a case of Blitzki'ieg. Naveh's argument 
is founded on the assumption that Manstein, the conceiver of the plan that was adopted for the 
offensive, did not belong to the hard nucleus of technocrats. Naveh also excludes the German 
offensive as an expression of operational art. However, he argues that Manstein, through his 
plan, expressed operational thinking at its best.^''^ How then can Fall Gelb not be operational art? 
Basing himself on Guderian’s book Panzer Leader, Naveh argues that the OKH version of the 
Manstein Plan did not specify what should be the operational objective after the crossing of the 
Meuse. Guderian was under the impression that whether the operational objective was Paris or 
the Channel was undecided.^^^ According to Naveh, the offensive turned into a sort of 
encirclement because of the limited dimensions of the operational space and because the allied 
forces advanced into Flanders and Belgium.”^^  ^Naveh suggests that the Wehrmacht focused 
solely on the technical aspects of the breakthrough.^^"
Van Creveld sees the paradox of what he calls German manoeuvre warfare during this period. 
Creveld claims that Blitzkrieg as a doctrine was only just being born. Fall Gelb therefore 
“developed as a mixture of the old operativ doctrine and the new system of independent, deep- 
striking operations by mechanized f o r c e s . T h i s  is supported by Wallach, who sees the 
offensive as a clear expression of the old operational doctrine, the Cannae like 
Gesamtschlacht^^ Macksey claimed that Fall Gelb would produce ”an annihilating 
encirclement such as the elder Moitke used to demand, and that the younger Moitke had sought 
and missed
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6.3 German Planning
Oil 27 September, the same day as Warsaw fell, Hitler told his generals of his wish for an attaek 
against the allies. In Hitler’s opinion the attaek should commence in just a month, since Hitler 
believed the French and British were not yet prepared for war.^ '^' On 9 October Hitler prepared 
both a memorandum and a directive for the offensive. The memorandum outlined his reasons for 
the coming offensive and was presented to the German military leadership.^^^ The memorandum 
is of interest because in this, Hitler declares his war aims.
In the memorandum Hitler accused Britain of wanting a weaker Germany in order to maintain a 
balance of power in Europe defined by Britain. But Germany deserved better. ”Das Ziel dieses 
Kampfes liegt [.,.] auf der Seite des Gegners in der [...] Vemichtung des Deutsches Reich.”^^ ^
In order to consolidate and develop the new Germany, the German Kriegsziel or Kriegsobjekt 
was the annihilation of their opponents. The German attack was to be mounted with the object of 
destroying the French aimy; but in any case it had to create a favourable initial situation. This 
was a prerequisite for a successful continuation of ’’Der Brutale Einsatz der Luftwaffe gegen das 
Herz des britischen Wiederstandswilles [...]”, in order to gain German dominance in Europe.
The Operationsobjekt was formulated as: “[djie Gesamte Fiihrung hat sich bei den 
bevorstehenden Operationen unentwegt vor Augen zu halten, da^ die Vemichtung der 
franzosisch-englischen Annee das gro|3e Ziel ist.”^^® The memorandum aims at total war.
However, the directive also outlined an Operationsobjekt. As opposed to the memorandum, the 
object was not the annihilation of the allied forces. The main point was to reduce the allied 
forces as much as possible in order to protect the industrial heart of Germany and launch further 
offensives against mainland Britain.^^^ The generals were gwon Auftrage through a directive that 
did not correspond to Hitler’s Absicht in the memorandum. The directive was not ”a précis of 
Hitler’s long winded memorandum” as Wallach claims.^^"
Some of the leading Gemian generals had a strategic vision that made them fear a new German 
’’adventure” in the west. General Ritter von Leeb, the commander of army group C, wrote in his 
diary on 11 October: ’’The decision to attack must be preceded by the question, what can such an 
attack achieve for us? [...] it leads to a war of attrition either before the French fortifications or
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already on Belgian territory. If it is a priori given a limited objective -  say, the capture or 
extension of our bases for aerial and submarine warfare -  this limitation will not prevent the war 
of attrition, and a secure basis for final victory is not [gained] by it either.
6.3.1 The First Plans
The first plan for the offensive in the west was presented to Hitler on 19 October. The plan 
proposed a Schwerpunkt with a strong right wing through Belgium. It was to be constituted by 
Army Group B, which also would have the bulk of the Panzer divisions. Hitler was not 
impressed and stated: ’’This is the old Schlieffen Plan with the strong right wing along the 
Atlantic Coast, one does not conduct such an operation unpunished twice.”^^  ^Although the axis 
on which the offensive was plaimed seemingly corresponded to that of the Schlieffen 
Denkschrift, it stopped short of the ’’wheeling of armies” around Paris. The plan appears to be in 
accordance with directive number 6, but it was also the expression of something imposed by 
Hitler on Generals who opposed him - ”eine ideeaimen Improvisation.” ®^^ It was a plan of 
limited objectives and it did not seek a decisive victoiy over the allied forces.
Did the plan reveal, as Mearsheimer proposes, that the Germans did not believe in a Blitzkrieg- 
style approach? Haider noted in his diary, that the methods used in the Polish campaign, where 
the German forces had more or less squeezed the Polish army from three sides, was not the 
proper method in the coming offensive.^®'' However, the Panzers had shown their merits, and 
they would be used extensively in the coming offensive. In his diary on 10 October, he 
underlined the following passages: ”We must not form a massive front. Split uo the enemv front! 
Concentrated attacks against single sectors bv a continuous flow of troops from the rear. This 
enables us to bring to bear our superiority in generalship.” ®^^ Haider’s line of thought might have 
fitted, at least partly, into some of the existing Blitzkrieg conceptions.
During a meeting on 25 October with his top generals, Hitler asked whether it was possible to 
shift the Schwerpunkt more the south and direct it towards Reims or Amiens. He also envisaged
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a smaller thrust towards Liège/®" A thrust towards Amiens would mean that the Germans would 
aim to defeat a larger portion of the allied forces than was planned in the 19 October version. 
Hitler’s ideas seem to have influenced the new plan that was presented on 29 October. This plan 
involved two Schwerpunkte. Both were in the sector of Army Group B, of which the left 
Schwerpunkt aimed more to the south than the previous plan. This plan, contrary to the first, 
clearly states that the Germans wanted a breakthrough to the Channel/®^ A more daring thrust by 
Amiy Group A, although without Panzer divisions, was also recommended.
On 11 November Hitler ordered that Army Group A should be the third Schwerpunkt. It was to 
be spearheaded by armoured and motorised units and attaek in the direction of Sedan. Haider 
noted in his diaiy on 9 November: “Fuerhrer insists that Armd. Divs. must under all 
circumstances strike in the direction Arlon-Tintigny.” ^ ®® It is not possible to deduce what Hitler 
meant with “under all circumstances”, but it suggests that Hitler was becoming increasingly 
determined to put his main thrust through the Ardennes.
On 20 November Hitler issued his directive number 8. This instructed what precautions be taken 
to enable the main weight of the attack to be shifted from Army Group B to Army Group A. This 
shift would be ordered should the disposition of enemy forces at any time suggest that Army 
Group A could achieve greater success/®^ The rationale behind this was that German generals 
were unsure whether the Allies would advance into Belgium at the outset of hostilities, and how 
deep this advance eventually would be. With the preparatory arrangements for a shift of 
Schwerpimkt, the Germans would gain flexibility and thus be able to choose an encircling attack 
either ft om the north or south.^^" This arrangement caused some uncertainty. On 20 December 
1939, Haider noted: “Str ength must be conserved for main effort in [Army Group A]. Has [Army 
Group A] a double mission?” “Operational intention divergences. Guderian at Sedan will not be 
strong enough for major operation.”
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The German military had been put on standby to attack in the near future off and on since late 
September 1939. On 10 January, Hitler decided to attack on 17 January, obviously unaware that 
two very unlucky Luftwaffe offieers that had with them documents concerning the plans for the 
offensive, crash-landed with their plane in Belgium.^^^ As the Germans were not sure how much 
of their plans were revealed, the attack was postponed on 13 January until the spring.^"^ In light 
of the events during the evolution of the plan, and the incident on 10 January 1940, the plan was 
not dramatically changed. The third draft of 30 January was more or less a eopy of the plan from 
29 October, but with the amendments of Hitler’s 11 November directions. This plan went more 
or less unaltered until 24 Febmary.
The aims and objectives of the memorandum and the directive, and the German anticipation of 
the coming war’s character implies that the Germans never sought to pursue what Mearsheimer 
call a limited aim strategy. As Umbreit points out, there was not even a strategic concept of how 
the war was to be decided in Germany’s favour, in the event of a successful campaign with a 
limited objective,^^'' As for the style of warfare, Haider’s 10 October note in the diary and the 
different plans without any properly foimulated end state, reveals a design rather like 
Ludendorffs Operation Michael. One hacked a hole into the front, and the rest was supposed to 
come on its own. The only direction was to defeat a major, but otherwise undefined proportion 
of the enemy forces and to gain territory along the Channel.
6.3.2 The Manstein Plan
During the period from October 1939, General Manstein, who was the chief of staff of Aimy 
Group A, had developed his own idea of how the offensive should be executed. What struck 
Manstein, like Hitler when learning of the first draft, was that it was a repetition of the Schlieffen 
plan.^ ^^
In Manstein's opinion, the limited objectives did not justify the political implications of violating 
the neutrality of the Low-Countries. Nor did it justify the military stakes involved. Manstein
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feared that the offensive would peter out on the Somme and turn into a war of attrition, a fear he 
shared with many of the generals. The most potent allied forces were located at the French- 
Belgian boarder. An offensive with a strong right wing would then clash with the main enemy 
forces. ’’Schwerpunkt werde auf Schwerpunkt treffen.”^^ " The offensive outlined by the OKH 
would at best give operational advantages. Moreover, Manstein was of the opinion that, if a 
continuation of the war against Britain were to succeed, Germany would need territory along the 
entire Channel coast. By shifting the main thrust ftom Army Group B to Army Group A, the 
latter would attack where the enemy least expected it.^ ^^  Manstein envisaged an offensive where 
Army Group A was given the bulk of the Panzers divisions. These would advance through the 
Ardennes Forest in the direction of Sedan. Once a breakthrough was made, the Panzer divisions 
would cross the Meuse and advance along the Somme River towards the Channel. By doing this 
allied forces would be caught in a gigantic Kessel. Army Group B would be functioning as an 
anvil and Army Group A as the hammer. ’’This was the only possible means of destroying the 
enemy’s entire northern wing in Belgium preparatory to winning a final victory in France. 
Between 31 October 1939 and 12 January 1940, Manstein wrote seven memoranda, signed by 
his superior, Rundstedt, to OKH.^"^ The memoranda reveal that Manstein also realised that the 
allies would not necessarily give in after a successful campaign against the allied forces to the 
north. In most of the documents he warns about the danger of not seeking a decisive victory over 
the whole French aimy. What he had in mind, in addition to the French forces by the Belgium 
border, was the concentration of forces at the Maginot-line. Moreover, Manstein foresaw that the 
advance towards the Channel would expose the left flank for a French counter-attack. However, 
it was not in Manstein’s mind that the vacuum followed by the advance of the Panzer divisions 
should be filled with slow moving infantry to guard against flanking attacks. That would tie the 
speed of the Panzers to that of the foot-mobile infantry. The solution would rather be to use 
motorised infantry in conjunction with the Panzers to attack French forces on the left flank. The 
French would then be kept from being able to concentrate for serious attacks, or to form a 
massive front on the left flank. For this Manstein wanted to use one Army (out of five
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participating in the offensive) to move south in the direction of Reims. This move was also 
meant to consolidate the pivot point at Sedan so that it could prevent any counter-attack from the 
Verdun sector. Moreover, the area around Sedan was to be the pivot point for a later thrust to 
the south. This thrust, a Fall Rot, was to complete the destruction of the remaining French army.
According to Frieser, Haider’s view on the memoranda and Manstein’s plan was that it was an 
egocentric attempt on behalf of Army Group A. It wanted to play a more prominent role in the 
coming campaign.^"' OKH’s neglect of Manstein’s plan is often described as a conflict between 
two personalities, Haider the bureaucratic disciplinarian against the intuitive and emotional 
Manstein. According to Leach, Haider’s dislike of Manstein became nourished when the latter 
reminded him about Moltke’s dictum that errors in the initial deployment cannot be corrected in 
the course of the operation. The comment was directed at the OKH plan, which opted for a shift 
of the Schwerpunkt to whichever army gi’oup that achieved the greatest initial success.
Manstein’s view then is contrary to modem manoeuvre warfare doctrines. As we have seen the 
doctrines opt for shifts of the main effort very much as that envisaged in the OKH plan. 
Nevertheless, the assumption that there was a conflict between Manstein and Haider, does not 
take into accomit that Haider probably never was satisfied with this plan. After all, Haider 
worked under the auspices of Hitler and was subject to his diverging ideas. Moreover, initially he 
was against a campaign in the West. Haider’s failure to respond positively to the proposed plan 
must also be put in the context of the fact that the offensive was never more than two weeks 
away.^ "^
In Haider’s diary, there are two references to Manstein’s memoranda. The first reference is made 
on 19 December, and Haider noted that he received an “idiotic proposal by Agp.A.” "^^  His 
negative attitude does not seem to be very deep rooted. On 27 December he referred to the plan 
only in neutral terms. The reference concerned a war game that examined Manstein’s plan.®"'' 
The war game revealed the worrying prospects of a French counter attack on the left flank of 
Army Group A.®"® But after the pressure of a near imminent offensive had been taken off during 
January, Haider seems to have become more open to other ideas. On 7 February Haider attended 
a sand table exercise that was held by Army Group A. According to Manstein, Haider was now
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beginning to realise the validity of the plan/"" A new exercise on 14 February made him more 
interested and perhaps convinced him of the basic layout/"^
Did Hitler know of the plan? And if so, when did he become aware of it? Did he respond 
positively? There are several versions of this story. As we have seen, in late October 1939, Hitler 
came up with the question regarding an aimoured thrust through the Ardennes. According to 
Mearsheimer, Hitler’s adjutant Schmundt visited Army Group A in late December. There he was 
presented Manstein’s plan through Blumentritt, a supporter of Manstein. Schmundt requested a 
copy and shortly thereafter presented it to Hitler. Schmundt called Blumentritt and told him that 
the Fuehrer had read it with great interest and liked it for its audacity.®"® Manstein recalls that 
Schmundt got a copy of a memorandum he wrote concerning his plan, but fails to give a date for 
it. He does not mention any positive phone calls about either.®"  ^As Blumentritt was a staunch 
supporter of the plan and Manstein, he would surely have mentioned such a telephone call to his 
superior.
According to Frieser, Schmundt’s visit occurred in late January.®'" When he returned from the 
visit he excitedly told one of Hitler’s other adjutants. Major Engel, that Manstein had presented 
views that conesponded with Hitler’s on the Schwerpunkt issue. Engel noted in his diary that 
Scinnundt informed Hitler on 5 February. Hitler showed interest in the plan despite his 
reservations about Manstein. Schmundt then proposed a consultation between Hitler and 
Manstein. Hitler was positive to such an idea but wanted to keep Haider unaware of the 
meeting.®' ' In the mean time Haider was working on persormel rotation issues. Apparently in 
order to get rid of the troublesome Manstein, Haider wanted him replaced.®'^ Manstein was 
assigned to coimnand a reseive corps in Prussia, far from the coming events, on 27 January.
According to Frieser, it was in the wake of this rotation that Schmundt, came up with the 
konspirativen idea of arranging a luncheon with the newly appointed corps commanders,
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obviously realising that Manstein was blocked from presenting his ideas to Hitler.®'® According 
to Engel’s diary, the event seems to have been less dramatic and conspirational. The luncheon 
took place on 17 February. During it Hitler and Manstein had a private meeting, where the 
former was presented with the plan. Manstein noted that Hitler was surprisingly quick to grasp 
the points, indicating that he had been informed in advance.®Hitler had already decided the 
issue. On 13 Febmary Hitler told Jodi of his decision to commit the mass of his armour to the 
breakthrough, where the enemy would least expect it, at Sedan.®'® Jodi passed on to OKH the 
task of making a plan in accordance with Hitler’s decision.®'" On 18 February Hitler summoned 
Haider to the Chancellery. The chief of the General Staff brought with him a new version o f Fall 
Gelb, not unlike Manstein’s original plan. The same day Haider noted in his diary:
“Original plan was to break through the enemy front between Liège and the Maginot Line. [...]. 
The central feature of that plan was to concentrate the main weight in the south and to use 
Antwerp instead of Liège as the pivot of the great wheeling movement. Now we have reverted to 
the original scheme.”®"^ - At least for the record.
6,3.3 The adopted plan
Manstein’s plan did not suiwive unaltered. In fact, in the new compromise with Hitler, the 
important prerequisite for the second phase to the south was taken out. The lack of a Fall Rot, 
which would have given directions on the total annihilation of all French forces, and other 
changes made this into a new plan.
In Manstein’s discussions with Guderian during the autumn of 1939 he learned that Guderian 
wanted every Panzer for the operation. Manstein thought such a request would only nourish the 
suspicion that Army Group A was acting selfishly. Manstein reasoned that, if his ideas about a 
main thrust to the south were accepted, the distribution and concentration of forces would 
follow. Guderian played his part. Haider noted during the sand table exercise on 14 Febmary that 
Guderian seemed to have lost confidence in success.®'® He would need more armour. At best he
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wished for all Panzer divisions to be concentrated in the Sedan sector. Manstein's meeting with 
Hitler, revealed that the concentration of Panzers was a conditio sine qua non?^^
As it turned out, seven of the ten Panzer divisions were attached to Army Group A. The last 
version of the old plan had distributed the Panzer divisions with six to Army Group B, and two 
to Amiy Group A. But the change in the new plan was not as radical as it appears. The old plan 
opted for three Schwerpunkte, of which two were formed by Army Group B. Both had three 
panzer divisions each. The new plan expanded the area of responsibility for Army Group A and 
reduced Army Group B’s accordingly. Had Army Group A had the same area of responsibility 
through the whole piaiming process, the number of Panzer divisions would have been increased 
from five to seven. Hitler did not want to give all the armoured units to Army Group A. Too 
weak a northern thmst would make the allies realise it was not their main thmst, especially given 
the reputation the German Panzers had earned in Poland. Moreover, if the allies realised that the 
Geimans were not attacking with the support of armour, they might be tempted to let the 
Belgians do most of the fighting for them. Thus, the allies would be able to manoeuvre in order 
to engage the oncoming thmst from the south.® "^
The noteworthy change in the operational concept was that the southernmost Schwerpunkt 
increased its number of Panzer divisions from two to five and that these were organised into a 
Panzer group consisting of two Panzer corps. The idea of having a fully motorised Panzer group 
with all amis present in order to conduct independent operations had no equivalent among the 
French and British. They continued to organise their armour into divisions and brigades. This 
meant that what we would call the operational level could conduct its operations within a 
different perception of the time factor than that of the allied forces. However, a prerequisite for 
this had to be that it would be treated as an operational level unit independent from the pure 
infantry armies. The creation of a Panzer group was, as Frieser points out, a controversial 
experiment. ®®' The chain of command between the Panzer Group, the infantry armies and Army 
group A was also a compromise that would cause some friction during the operation.
One other important aspect of the planning of Fall Gelb concerns the time factor and the 
controversy over open flanks. Guderian wanted to push his mobile forces towards the Channel 
without any cover on the flanks. Haider wanted to wait until he had enough forces in the Sedan 
area.®^  ^ This was contrary to Manstein’s original idea. It would lead to a slow advance, with
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infantry moving like pearls on a string behind the mobile units. Manstein's original plan opted 
for a mobile flank protection that sought to attack French formations before they could 
concentrate and become a threat. However, this idea, Aufrollen, would have led to a weakening 
of the strength and momentum of the Schwerpunkt. Apparently Haider recognised that the 
German Army was only partly mechanised, and that there were in fact considerable losses of 
vehicles during the Polish campaign. Some units were down to 50% of their organic transport 
strength, and it took some considerable efforts and improvisation to improve the situation. 
Although the overall operational design of the original Manstein plan was kept, it was a new 
plan. It did not contain a Fall Rot, which Manstein had envisaged. There were fewer Panzer 
divisions and more foot mobile infantry for protection of the southern flank. For Army Group A 
however, the Auftrag given on 24 Febmary was:
“Auftrag der Heeresgmppe A ist, unter Deckung der linlcen Flanke des Gesamtangriffs gegen 
feindl. Einwirkung aus dem geschiitzten Bereich um Metz und Verdun, moglichst rasch den 
übergang über die Maas zwischen Dinant und Sedan (beide einschl.) zu erzwingen, um weiterhin 
unter Abdeckend der Flanken moglichst rasch und moglichst stark im Riicken der 
nordfranzosichen Grenz-befestigugszone in Richtung auf die Somme-Mimdung durchzustopen.”
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6.3.4 Guderian meets Hitler
There seems to have been a special relationship between Hitler and Guderian. Engel, Hitler’s 
adjutant noted in his diary that Guderian on 22 November had called at Hitler’s office.® '^' 
Guderian wanted to meet Hitler in person in the wake of reports to Hitler from OKH that there 
were instances of insubordination among German soldiers. According to Engel, Guderian had 
informed Hitler that the status of the Army was not as bad as the report stated.®^ ® The day after 
Hitler delivered a speech that in Guderian’s opinion was designed to strengthen the political 
attitude of the officer corps. In fact Hitler’s speech was the expression of a fundamental distrust 
between Hitler and the top generals. This distmst does not seem to have included Guderian, at 
least for the moment.®®"
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As we have seen, the new plan was adopted on 24 February. In mid March Hitler met with 
Giiderian. During the meeting the two discussed establishing the bridgehead at the Meuse. Hitler 
then turned to the question on the further progress of the operation. Guderian answered: ’’Unless 
I receive orders to the contrary, I intend on the next day to continue my advance westwards. The 
supreme leadership must decide whether my objective is to be Amiens or P a r i s . T h e n  Hitler 
nodded and said nothing more.
On March 17 Hitler held a conference for his top generals. Haider noted: ’’Decision reserved on 
further moves after the crossing of the Meuse. [...]. He plays with the idea that a mild bleeding 
of the enemy forces will suffice to break their will to resist.” Why did Hitler ask Guderian 
what he would do after the breakout at Sedan? Why did Guderian come up with the alternatives 
Paris or the English Channel? What did Hitler mean by reserving the decision on further moves 
after the crossing of the Meuse? Had he, as Naveh proposes, not decided on whether it was going 
to be Paris or the Channel after all?
What is clear is that Hitler still was not convinced of the feasibility of the plan. He wanted more 
plans to be worked out. Throughout February and March different plans with different 
objectives, involving offensives conducted by Army Group C and Italian forces were 
discussed.^^^ Apparently nothing came out of these. However, the discrepancies between the 
memorandum and the directive, the reservation on further moves, the lack of a Fall Rot in the 
adopted plan, and the different contingency plans made out in March, indicate that Hitler had not 
decided whether his objectives were limited or unlimited. Mearsheimer’s suggestion that the 
Germans pursued limited objectives may therefore not be regarded as the final conclusion.
6.4 German execution
It is not within the scope of this thesis to cover the movements and actions of either the allied or 
the German armed forces. This part will be concerned with Army Group A’s, Kleist’s and 
Guderian’s conduct of operations to the point where it was obvious where the Schwerpunkt was 
directed. That is a stoiy that has been presented as one of some considerable friction and does 
not necessarily reflect Van Creveld’s view:
”[T]he German Ai-my’s system of organization reflected a deliberate choice, a conscious 
determination to maintain at all costs that which was believed to be decisive to the conduct of
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war: mutual trust, a willingness to assume responsibility, and the right and duty of subordinate 
commanders at all levels to make independent decisions and carry them out.” At least at the 
highest command levels Geyer contests Creveld’s statement. ’’Rather than enhancing co­
operation and creating a smooth functioning machine for mechanised warfare, Blitzkrieg pitted 
staffs and commanders against each other in the quest for optimal performance in the planning 
and conducting of war.”^^ '
6.4.1 Through the Ardennes
Some 40 000 vehicles of all kinds and 140 000 men comprised the main thmst through the 
Ardennes. Guderian, commanding three Panzer divisions could now put to test the theories he 
presented in his hook Achtung Panzer. His buzzword was ’’klotzen nicht kleckern”. He wanted 
his forces to reach the Meuse on the third day, and cross it on the fourth. It took two days to 
reach the River Meuse. However, the dash through the Ardennes could have ended in 
catastrophe. Already on the first day. General Reinhardt noted that the whole plan fell apart like 
a house of cards.^^  ^Units became mixed and during the three days, the higher echelon staffs had 
no clear picture of which unit was where. On the third day the largest traffic jam ever in 
European history was a fact.^ "^^
There were several factors leading to the chaos. First, the plan had a number of faults. Three 
weeks before the faults had been revealed during an exercise. But obviously not enough was 
done to correct them. In many places the Belgians had deliberately taken away road signs as a 
counter measure, and there were also instances where units were ordered to attack what were 
believed to be larger enemy foimations. This led to a deviation from the pre-planned route, with 
a subsequent mixing up. However, one of the most influential factors seems to have been 
initiative among junior commanders. There had been reports on lack of initiative in Poland. This 
was suddenly turned around. Guderian’s slogan ”in three days on the Meuse” made the units 
ignore the traffic control measures and move forward as rapid as possible.
On 11 May, Kleist sent out a message to his subordinate commanders. It stated that the problems 
were caused primarily by independent decisions being made by lower level leaders. Further 
breaches of the traffic control measures would be punished by death.^^  ^But perhaps, as Frieser 
points out, it was only initiatives from the junior leadership that could have saved the thrust
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towards the Meuse. In his opinion it was the reactionary leadership of Army Group A, those who 
did not understand the nature of armoured warfare who were to blame. Accordingly, they tried to 
direct and to manage the queues instead of letting them have their natural flow.^^  ^A wedge was 
driven between the proactive Panzer leaders and the old school of the traditional arms. Frieser 
states that this distrust was one of the main reasons why Fall Gelb during phases resembled 
"cine freien Operation.” Was \X Auftragstaktik or ]Visi common objective that became the factor 
of success?
Although there was chaos in the Ardennes, the advance was more rapid than the pessimists in 
OKH had anticipated. According to General Blumentritt, it “was not really an operation, in the 
tactical sense, but an approach march.”^^  ^What seems to have saved the Germans was the almost 
total absence of allied aircraft. The diaries of OKH and Army Group A noted that the enemy air 
force was astoundingly cau t i ous . The  French Air Force committed only a fraction of their air 
assets and had fallen into the trap. They believed that the German main thrust was to the north 
and deployed their air assets accordingly.^^^ The approach march also revealed that the Germans 
and the French operated in totally different time dimensions. The French had assessed that a 
potential German thrust through the Ardennes would take some 15 days, five days longer than 
Haider believed.
6.4.2 Crossing the Meuse
On 12 May, Guderian and Kleist also had an argument on where to cross the Meuse. Kleist 
wanted Guderian to cross 13 km west of Sedan in order to rupture the flanks that tied the French 
2“^  and 9'’^ Armies together. Guderian wanted the crossing to take place at Sedan, both because 
that was what he had planned for, and because he wanted to take out French artillery threatening 
the flank. Guderian got his way, but Kleist wanted him to cross the Meuse on 13 May at 1600 
hours, in order to keep pressure up on the French. Guderian, who at this time only had two of his
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three Panzer divisions in the area, wanted to wait for the arrival of the last division and the 
artillery following in its trail. At this point Kleist did not compromise.
In early May Guderian had planned the use of air assets together with the commander of the 2”“^ 
Fliegerkorps, a subordinate unit to the 3'^ Luftflotte for the crossing. It was an elaborate plan, 
which opted for a several-hours-long continuous bombardment of the French positions on the 
western side of the Meuse. But according to Frieser, Kleist had co-ordinated the use of air to 
ground missions with the commander of the 3^"^  Luftflotte. Kleist’s plan opted for a concentrated 
bombardment that was supposed to last for twenty minutes. However, the diaiy of Army Group 
A, reveals that the difference of opinion between Guderian and Kleist initially was not that great. 
According to Army Group A’s diary, the 3‘^  Luftflotte was supposed to start prepatory attacks at 
0800 hours. The attacks were to be intensified and reach its peak between 1400 and 1600 hours. 
But during the evening of 12 May, the commander of the Luftflotte informed that his units 
would not be ready to attack from 0800 hours. The attack had to be concentrated between 1400 
and 1600.^ ^^ ^
However, Kleist’s order to attack before Guderian felt ready meant that new orders had to be 
given. There was insufficient time for both the army and air force staffs to write and disseminate 
the necessary complex written orders for the river crossing. A staff officer recognised that the 
present situation coincided closely with that envisaged in the war games that were conducted 
before the invasion. By changing the hours in these plans Guderian’s Panzer Corps would use 
elaborate written formal orders after all.^ "^ ^
As it turned out Guderian got his way. But this was not because he disobeyed. According to 
Frieser, the Commander of the 2’^  ^Fliegerkorps later said that, when his superior, the commander 
of the Luftflotte, approached him to co-ordinate the change of plans, he ignored it. He had 
come too late, and the change would lead to confusion. Guderian himself seems to have been 
unaware of what had happened.^ "^ "^  The episodes reveal that the commander of the 3^  ^Luftflotte 
probably had no clear picture of the tasks of his subordinate unit. This was a consequence of a 
lack of co-ordination among the officers. Kleist, who is regarded as the more conseiwative, was 
at this stage more aggressive and was more preoccupied with the speed of the breakthrough at 
the expense of applying firepower to achieve it, than Guderian was. Guderian wanted all three
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Panzer divisions on the stage together with the corps artilleiy and an 8-hour long bombardment. 
When it was not possible with a long bombardment, Kleist would rather keep up the speed. 
Nevertheless, as it turned out, it was the infantry and Luftwaffe that successfully achieved the 
break in and partly also the breakthrough. Guderian’s first armoured vehicle crossed the Meuse 
after the infantry had secured a bridgehead on May 14.^ "^ ^
Once over the Meuse German initiative reached new heights Accordingly Guderian acted on 
his own intuition. “I never received any further orders as to what I was to do once the bridgehead 
over the Meuse was captured. All my decisions until I reached the Atlantic seaboard at Abbeville 
were taken by me and me a l o n e . D i d  Guderian not receive any orders once he got his 19‘^  
Panzer Corps over the Meuse? Did he use, as Lind claims the tactical event — the crossing of the 
Meuse - strategically, and decided what tactical actions to take -  where to fight and whether to 
fight -  on a strategic basis? Was he directing his Schwerpunkt directly at the allied strategic 
centre of gravity?
6.4.3 The Accordion
On 14 May, Guderian’s Panzer Corps was still crossing the Meuse. During the early morning the 
French had launched a counterattack with aimoured units that threatened the southern flank of 
the German bridgehead. The counterattack petered out in the early afternoon, but the French 
were still in possession of key terrain features around Stonne. Aerial reconnaissance also 
reported on new formations of French armour concentrating in the area of the exposed left 
flank.^ '^ ® The story is at this point a bit unclear. Frieser, basing himself on doeuments from 
Guderian’s Panzer corps claims that Guderian at 1400 hours on 14 May ordered his f  ^ and 2"  ^
Panzer divisions to turn towards the west in the direction of Rethel. Later in Frieser’s work it 
appears that Guderian made this decision as early as 2200 hours on 13 May.^ "^  ^As we shall see, 
Guderian’s decision might not have been that independent as many claim. Nevertheless, with f  ^ 
and 2"  ^Panzer division advancing towards the west on 14 May, it was only the battered 
Grossdeutschland infantiy regiment, and parts of his 10‘^’ Panzer Division that held the flank. At 
1830 hours Kleist approved Guderian’s order, but at 2200 hours, Kleist intervened and
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demanded the and 2"*^  Panzer divisions to reach a line short of the one previously decided.^^^ 
After a heated argument Kleist agreed to let Guderian continue his advance towards Rethel.
Guderian’s objective was to lupture the flanks that tied the French 2"^  and 9^*^ Armies together. 
Creating a wedge towards Rethel would complete this. But once he reached the town he was in 
faet no more than 100 miles from Paris. Did Guderian really think that Rethel was the point from 
where a decision to head either towards the Channel or Paris could be made? Had Guderian, as 
Lind and Deighton claim, made a decision that was of “such vital importance that it was more a 
strategic than a tactical one”?^ ^^  Could all the ambiguities prior to the operation prove Naveh 
right in that the Genuans, or at least Hitler, really had not decided on whether to advance 
towards Paris or the Channel?
According to Frieser, relying on Blumentritt’s study, the Panzer divisions were to keep their 
positions at the bridgehead until the infantry divisions that followed secured it. Not until then 
was the armour to break out of the area round Sedan. Hitler’s statement that ’’Decision reseiwed 
on further moves after the crossing of the Meuse” was because he feared open flanks.^^  ^But the 
flanks would be of importance whether he had in mind either Paris or Amiens. The war diaries of 
Army Group A reveals a stoiy that suggest another interpretation of Guderian’s role.
On 13 May, the diary of Army Group A states an awareness of the slow progress of the Panzer 
divisions.” Bin Überschreiten der Maas wahrend der Nacht [12-13 May] ist nicht geglückt.”^^  ^
Later that night Kleist reported on the progress to Army Group A.
Doughty, basing himself on the report from Kleist’s headquarters, claims that “Kleist confidently 
reported to Army group A that all three [of Guderian’s Panzer division’s] had crossed the Meuse 
River and that on the 14‘^  stronger forces would be pushed across the Ardennes Canal.” Thus 
Guderian’s superiors did not understand how vulnerable the bridgehead was. However, because 
of the situation during the morning on 13 May, Rundstedt decided to travel to Kleisf s 
headquarters at 1400 hours. This means that the commander of Army Group A was in a position 
to monitor the progress of Kleisf s units during the evening on 13 May. Were both Kleist and 
Rundstedt wrongly informed?
According to Doughty, Kleisf s report was transmitted to Army Group A at 2040 hours on 13 
May. However, this is not reflected in the diary of Army Group A. In the diary it is stated that
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Lieutenant Colonel Tresckow, who was with Rundstedt, at 1930 hours, sent the report from 
Kleist’s headquarters to Army Group A. What the headquarters of Army Group A received was 
not a statement that all the Panzer divisions had crossed. It stated that the 1®^ and 10 ’^ Panzer 
divisions had started crossing, but that the 2"  ^Panzer division still was at the northern bank of 
the river.^^  ^Moreover, because of the situation, Rundstedt decided to stay in Kleist’s position 
until next morning.
The report from Giuppe von Kleist also reveals ihoAbsicht for 14 May. It was to broaden the 
bridgehead, and with emphasis on speed, break out and advance towards the line Rethel- 
Montcomet-Hirson. Rundstedt supported this intention. The intention stated the maximum 
objective to reach in geographic terms. The town of Rethel was on his extreme left. No further 
progress was intended on 14 May. During the night, Guderian’s Panzer corps had only made 
slow progress. On the morning on 14 May he had only managed to establish a small bridgehead 
and his units on the left side of the river were advancing towards Chehery. Army Group A ’s 
diai-y states that Rundstedt had conversations with Kleist and Guderian during the morning 
hours. We may therefore assume that Rundstedt was correctly informed about the progress. 
During the conversations, the commander of Army Group A stressed the importance of as fast as 
possible winning teixain to the west, “auch in operativer Hinsicht”.^ ^^  This means that Guderian, 
when he on 13 May at 2200 hours decided to advance towards Rethel and when he on 14 May at 
1400 hours gave orders to his and 2“^  Panzer divisions to advance towards Rethel, acted in 
accordance with his superiors’ Absicht for 14 May.^^  ^The late entries of the diary on 14 May 
also state that Guderian “im Sinne der Hinweise des O.B. der Heeresgruppe Kràfte auf das 
Westuger des Kanals zu verschieben. [...] Absicht Gruppe von Kleist. Welter in westlicher 
Richtung vorstossen.”^^ ^
However, Rundstedt also ordered Gmppe von Kleist temporarily under the command of 12^*^ 
Army. It was necessary “die Kampfliandlungen der Gmppe von Kleist und der 12.Arme in einen 
gewissen Einklang miteinander zu bringen[.]”^^® The order for the 12^  ^Army this day was to 
leave the bridgehead and as fast as possible advance towards west and reach the line Hirson- 
Montcornet. This line is well north of Rethel. Unless Guderian was tasked to Aufrollen, his
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orders to his corps with the intention to reach Rethel on 15 May, implies that he was going to 
deviate from the Schwerpunkt,
On 14 May Haider’s diaiy states that “Gruppe Kleist in massive formation must drive toward the 
sea at St. Omer [.. This means that OKH did not have any serious concerns about the 
situation of the southern flank, and that they intended to follow the plan of 24 Febmary. The 
diaiy of Army Group A also reveals that the saw the French as fighting bravely, “aber ohne 
Zusammenheng”.^ ^^  There was no French Schwerpunkt.
According to Doughty, Kleist wanted to halt at a line short of that stated in the intentions of 
Army Group A, because they wanted to wait until the follow-on infantry could reinforce the 
bridgehead.^^^ In that case it appears that it was Kleist that acted contrary to Rundstedt’s 
intention. After Kleist and Guderian had had their heated debate, Guderian called and 
complained about “faint-hearted higher headquarters.”^^"* Accordingly, Doughty’s conclusion is 
that Guderian was thinking in far broader and deeper terms than his conservative superiors, who 
did not know a great deal about the situation of Guderian’s corps. That might have been the case. 
Had Guderian spent less time on the front line, he might have had a good overview himself in 
order to report his situation. If there were any uncertainties about the situation, that could just as 
well have been a result of a confused command arrangement, where an operational unit, Panzer 
Gruppe Kleist, the “umstrittenes operatives Experiment”, suddenly was put under a new 
command. At least Rundstedt was thinking in just as broad terms as Guderian.
During the night on 15 May, OKH gave directions that 12**^ Army was to turn its front to the 
south. Rundstedt explicitly stated that he could not take responsibility for this as it now was 
heading west. This would lead to hopeless chaos. OKH did not have any problems with 
accepting Rundstedt’s argument.^^^ Rundstedt now gave 12^*^ Army the task to, “ohne Rücksicht
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auf die Gefalirdung ilirer Südflanke” advance towards the line Hirson-Montcomet. In a meeting 
with the commander of the 12**^ Army, Rundstedt also emphasised that Gruppe von Kleist should 
not be bound to the tempo of the infantry.^^^
However, later on 15 May, Rundstedt was becoming concerned about the southern flank and 
considered a halt at the river Oise. He assessed that if the enemy attacked from the direction of 
Laon it would be harmful to the tempo of the Gesamtoperation. According to Doughty, basing 
himself on documents from 12^*^ Army and Kleist’s headquarters, late on 15 May, the 12**^ Army 
issued order for the next day with the objective of winning more territory to the west. A 
defensive posture should be taken on 16 May. Doughty does not state how far the advance 
should be, but judging from Rundstedt’s considerations on 15 May it should be no further than 
the Oise. That is consistent with Rundstedt’s decision on 16 May at 1300 that no further 
advances should be made and that crossing the Oise-Sambre line should only be made with his 
consent.^ ^^
But late on 15 May, Kleist gave Guderian a new halt order, which has been the focus of attention 
in much of the literature concerning the campaign. Guderian became furious and neither would, 
nor could agree to these orders.^^^ After what was a heated argument, Kleist agreed to let 
Guderian continue his advance, a reconnaissance in force, for another 24 hours.^^  ^However, 
Kleist’s permission to allow Guderian to continue does not seem to deviate too much from the 
directions given by the 12^*" Army or Army Group A. According to Frieser, the halt line for 17 
May was Avesnes-Vei'vins-Monteornet, well east of the Sambre-Oise line. This is not consistent 
with Rundstedt’s decision on 16 May and the fact that Guderian had already reached Montcomet 
on 16 May.^ *^^
Guderian now advanced as fast as he could. Late on 16 May, his first units reached the River 
Oise, which was as far as he was allowed to advance. Rundstedt noted in the diary of Army 
Group A that he, but especially Kleist and Guderian, had no doubt that they could still cross the 
Oise. The enemy was retreating in “groPer Unordnung, ja Auflosung”. But he now feared that 
his southern flank was too weak. An attack on the flank at this stage would bring the whole
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operation in jeopardy. He therefore ordered a temporary halt in order to consolidate the flanlc.^^* 
This was the first halt order issued by Army Group A, but both Rundstedt and Haider at OKH 
were at this stage confident about a positive outcome of the operation. However, Guderian, still 
on the move towards the coast, sent out orders by radio to continue the advance. He did not clear 
this with his superior Kleist, which according to the Truppenfuhrung would have been the proper 
thing to do. Guderian’s radio message was intercepted by his superior’s headquarters. He now 
openly ignored an order.^^^ During the morning 17 May, Kleist met Guderian to reprimand him 
for disobeying orders, whereupon Guderian handed in his resignation. Some authors elaim that 
Rundstedt blamed Hitler and OKH for the halt o r d e r . B u t  there is nothing in the diaries of 
OKH or Army Group A that indicates this.
However dramatic this clash between Kleist and Guderian was, the interesting aspect in the 
overall picture at this stage in the campaign is that OKH, or at least Haider, considered the option 
of turning towards Paris. According to Warlimont, Haider’s only thought was to continue the 
rapid advance as vigorously as possible. The central feature of the operation was the “most rapid 
possible breakthrough to the coast.” But in the diaiy of OKH it is stated: “The [Schwerpunkt] 
of the south-western drive would have to be aimed at Compiègne, with the possibility of 
subsequently wheeling the right wing in south-eastern direction past Paris left open. A great 
decision must be taken now!”^^  ^Haider thought that by strengthening Army Group B with the 4*'^  
Army, which was under the command of Rundstedt, Aimy Group B would be strong enough to 
deal with the allied forces in northern France. At noon Haider only noted that there was little 
mutual understanding between him and Hitler. Hitler, as opposed to Haider, and for that matter 
Rundstedt, saw the main danger from the south. Thus his decision was to consolidate the 
southern flank, but at the same time let the motorised troops continue Ûyqïx DurchstoP northwest. 
Was there not a Sichelschnitt-^\wn after all?
Both Haider and Hitler wanted to take the line of least resistance, but they had different opinions 
as to where the enemy was strongest. Why would Guderian, the manoeuvrist, who had the same 
perception regarding the enemy strength as Haider, want to act in accordance with Hitler’s view? 
A reasonable thing for the manoeuvrists might have been to do exactly as Haider suggested.
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However, it appears that Guderian wanted to use his armour for the battle of annihilation in 
Northern France and not turn to Paris, whieh might have ended the war before a bloody 
Kesselschlacht. Is that, the attack on the primary enemy mass, the enemy’s most potent units, 
what Lind meant when he suggested that Guderian’s Schwerpunkt struck at the enemy’s strategic 
centre of gravity?
6.5 Conclusion
That Haider thought of turning towards Paris, that it was Hitler’s decision in March to reserve 
further moves, and that the directive for Fall Rot was issued on 31 May, all strengthen Naveh’s 
argument that the Germans had their focus on the breakthrough They wanted to win the first 
battle as they had wanted to in 1914, or to hack a hole in the front as Ludendorff had done in 
1918.^ ^^
But this does not mean that there was no plan, or operational design for the campaign. Except for 
Flalder’s line of thought there is no evidence that the Germans, during the operation, were 
thinking about deviating from the design that was adopted on 24 February. That Army Group B 
for example was ordered to reduce its speed of advance so as to keep the allied forces forward in 
Belgium and that Haider, as early as 14 May gave directions on advancing as fast as possible 
towards the Channel support the ease. This and Hitler’s directive number 6 suggest that the 
Germans, at least initially, were pursuing a strategy of limited objectives. The German plan and 
the conduct of the operation supported such a strategy. However, Hitler had visions for German 
hegemony in Europe, which his memorandum of 10 Oetober 1939 also reveals. That there were 
different plans with different objectives worked out in Mareh, which also involved Italian forces, 
implies that Hitler was pursuing unlimited objectives, and that his strategy was an opportunistic 
one. Fall Gelb was just a step on the road. He wanted to see how far he could go in order to 
realise his vision, and apparently total war eame upon him earlier than German society and the 
Wehrmacht was prepared for. Hitler’s problem as a strategist was to translate his vision into a 
coherent grand strategy and military strategy and into unambiguous objectives. How can then the 
Wehrmacht’s conduct be operational art other than perhaps in the Jominian sense of grand 
tactics? Which grand strategic objectives were they supporting?
Guderian is justified in his elaim that he did not receive any directions whether to advance 
towards Paris or the Channel. However, he was familiar with the plan. Guderian never acted, as
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is claimed, strategically on his own intuition. He was told what to do and acted until 16 May in 
accordance with the directions of the Army Group. He did however deviate from the course in a 
tactical sense. This happened for example when he turned south after the crossing, in order to 
fight the French on the flank. Once on the right course, the operation appears to have moved like 
an accordion. Guderian wanted to move fast, and this did not conflict with Rundstedt until 17 
May. However, there obviously were clashes between Guderian and Kleist.^^  ^But the sources 
and literature show some discrepancies regarding timing and the actual content of the orders that 
were given. The clashes between officers were unavoidable in the highly competitive system of 
the Wehrmacht, a system that undoubtedly fostered some personality traits that are not 
necessarily desirable in every society. It may also be doubtful whether such a system develops 
mutual trust, as Creveld claims it did.
Within the small manoeuvring space the Germans had during the first seven days of the 
campaign, a certain amount of synchronisation would be required in order to prevent units and 
columns from becoming entangled. In fact it would be a prerequisite for the concentration of 
forces. To paraphrase Guderian, was there really need for haste and disorder of this kind? The 
main concern for Army Group A was to win territoiy to the west, not for its own sake, but in 
order to deploy more troops into the Schwerpunktrmim. Contrary to what the manoeuvrists 
would have wanted, there was a preference for elaborate plans, especially at the critical crossing 
of the Meuse. Minimum objectives were not given, nor were there stated any intentions or 
desirable end states relating to the enemy. Battles were sought, which Guderian’s wish to attack 
through Sedan showed. Guderian’s primary targets were enemy artillery units. Kleist wanted to 
cross the Meuse 13 Ion west of Sedan, which would have secured more room for manoeuvre and 
avoided a head on clash like that around Stonne. Not at any stage were enemy command and 
control facilities discussed as possible targets or deliberately sought out for destruction.
However, unlike the allies, the Germans were successfiil in employing the full weight of their 
combined arms. But the plans for support from the Luftwaffe prior to the crossing reveal the 
friction that occurs when aims have, to use Leonhard’s terms, different velocities. There were 
different requirements for preparation, and in this ease tho Auftragstaktik, expressed by Guderian 
and the commander of the 2"^  Fliegerkorps, apparently without informing their superiors could 
have gone terribly wrong. The German strength, however flawed, appears to have been in their 
manner of organisation. By creating a Panzer group, but especially by keeping Luftwaffe units 
centralised at a higher echelon, they were able to plan and concentrate their assets within another
Guderian, Panzer Leader, 91. Guderian had no high opinions of Kleist even before the war.
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dimension of time and space than the allies. Fall Gelb was an operation where the strategic, 
operational and taetieal levels coineided in an offensive à Voutrance against an enemy whose 
strategy was “the avoidance of defeat, rather than immediate gaining of victory.”^^  ^It eould be 
summed up in Rommel’s words: “the battle of attrition is fought with the highest possible degree 
of mobility.
7 Cannae reconsidered
In 216 B. C. Hannibal's army met a Roman Army twice as large under the leadership of Varro 
and Paulus at Cannae. Hannibal deployed his troops in a half moon formation, pointing in 
convex shape toward the enemy. Hannibal’s less disciplined Gaul and Spanish troops were 
deployed in the middle of the formation, with the crack Carthaginian infantry at each end. Then 
Hannibal’s horsemen were sent to meet the Roman cavalry on the left wing. While the cavalry 
battle raged, the Roman infantry was ordered to attack the middle of Hannibal’s formation.^^*
The Romans believed that this was the weak spot. By concentrating his overwhelming combat 
power against a weakness in the formation, he could break through and split the Carthaginian 
anny in two. The two halves could then be defeated in detail, just like some historians suggest 
the Germans had done in 1914 and in 1940. The tribesmen withdrew, slowing down the Roman 
attempt to break through. Simultaneously Hannibal ordered his erack infantry to close in on the 
Roman flanks to conduct what has become known as the double envelopment.
In 1940 the French doctrinal solution to prevent an enemy from breaking through was a process 
called c o l m a t e r Troops would be moved in front of the attaeking enemy in order to slow him 
down, just as Hannibal’s Gauls had done. By pinning the enemy frontally, and simultaneously 
extending to the enemy’s soft flank, one eould seal off the sector where the enemy had broken in, 
just as Hannibal’s eraek infantry and cavalry did. However, the French did not get the 
opportunity to follow their doctrinal colmater approach. The Germans broke through and could 
defeat the two halves of the French army in sequence, just as the Romans had wanted to. The 
stoiy of the double envelopment is always seen fr om the vietorious Hannibal’s side. It has had an 
enchanting effect on generals. However as TruppenfUhrung states: “Any force executing an 
envelopment also runs the risk of being enveloped itself.
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General Saint states in his foreword to Doughty’s book The Breaking Point that “[t]he fight 
around Sedan once again demonstrated the inviolable axiom that the victoiy invariably goes to 
the dynamic frontline leader who exploits maneuver to focus combat power on his enemy’s 
weakness, who uses terrain as a lever not as a solution, and who personally intervenes when 
decisive action is required but does not exercise oveniding, oppressive control of his 
subordinates.”^^"* Those who want to present views contrary to those that prevail need heroes. In 
this case the manoeuvrists of the 1980’s, reformers with a progressive outlook, wanted to shake 
the cultural conservatism of the military establishment. Considering the number of doctrines that 
claim to have a manoeuvrist approach, these reformers have enjoyed a considerable success. 
However this success does not necessarily reflect how the manoeuvrists’ wars are conducted.
After the Second World War, the former chief of the German General Staff, Haider, was asked to 
comment on the 1949 version of the FM 100-5, and he answered in the spirit of Sehnarhorst: ”A 
manual should avoid anything that may be misinterpreted. It is impossible to overestimate the 
importance of a fixed standard nomenclature and terminology, and of clearly defined and 
universally understood concepts always used in an identical sense.”^^  ^ In this respect the 
manoeuvrists have not succeeded. The historical substantiation for the adoption of these 
doctrines has been distilled to a degi'ee where it eventually conforms to the manoeuvrist thought. 
In other cases manoeuvrist thought is just a reinventing of the wheel. It differs little from the 
doctrinal thinldng of the era preceding the alleged paradigm shift in the style of warfare. There 
are not one, but several, and contradictory forms of manoeuvre warfare. The first of its two 
common denominators is a preference for the offensive. The other is perhaps best expressed in 
the Norwegian doctrine, which states that manoeuvre warfare is about being the clever one.^^  ^
Who eould argue against that?
With regard to general system theory, there is a danger in the tacticisation of strategy, as some of 
the manoeuvrists propose. If there really is an attrition-manoeuvre dichotomy, attrition warfare 
would be about the idea that tactics govern strategy. In a strategic context, tactics is the 
expression of the mechanistic behaviour of elements within the system. The elements are 
pursuing efficiency in what they are programmed to do. That would lead to attrition. Strategy is 
about the dialectic between ends and means. Naveh described this in a lecture delivered at the 
Norwegian Army Officers Academy: “In conceptualizing the operational design, the operator not 
only antieipates a futuristic configuration, which would successfully terminate the operation, but
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also visualizes, in detail, the various components of the maneuvering system.”^^  ^The real 
strength of the Wehrmacht in May 1940 was perhaps that it had an operational design. Moreover, 
in Geimany, unlike other nations, there existed progressive and conservative forces that balanced 
each other. This is reflected in the German doctrine, which expressed the view that there was no 
finite answer, solution or method. The Germans were pragmatic with regard to the execution of 
their profession. Following a Hegelian view, a prerequisite for a synthesis is, as Hannah Arendt 
states in the book Activa Vita, “plurality is a conditio sine qua non.”^^  ^Plurality requires 
independent thinking. Manoeuvre warfare, although it promotes the idea of independent 
thinking, may not succeed in this respect, as it prescribes which operational patterns to use and 
the personality traits to those who should employ them. Perhaps the real suceess of manoeuvre 
warfare is that it invites debate.
In her article on non-linear dynamics, Linda Beckerman states: “[T]he issue is not whether or not 
the existing doctrine is conect. The issue is why it has changed so little, why it is so mono­
stable, given radical changes in the identity and nature of our adversaries.”^^  ^We may not agree 
that conventional wars are over, but we could provide Beckerman with an answer both as to why 
doctrines have ehanged so little, and why they probably will not change. During the middle of 
the 1990’s, when manoeuvre warfare was introduced to the Norwegian military vocabulary, one 
of the most profiled proponents compared manoeuvre warfare with Blitzkrieg. It was hardly 
debated. Four years after the adoption of a manoeuvre warfare doctrine, the term “Network 
Centric Warfare” is becoming absorbed in the armed forces. The same proponent illustrates the 
new concept by using the Blitzkiieg analogy. The good thing is perhaps that Network Centric 
Warfare promises self-synchronisation.^^^
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